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ABSTRACT
The American public’s attention was first exposed to the practice
of surrogacy in 1988 with the drama and verdict of the Baby M case.
Over the last twenty-five years, the practice of surrogacy has slowly
become increasingly socially accepted, and even welcomed. This evo-
lution serves to emphasize the bizarre judicial and legislative si-
lence regarding surrogacy that exists today in the vast majority of
U.S. jurisdictions. In this Article, I describe and trace the dramatic
revolution that took place during the recent decades, as the surro-
gacy practice has drastically changed from one viewed as problem-
atic and rejected to a socially widespread and accepted practice. As
set forth below, this recent shift demands increasing the legal rec-
ognition of the legality of surrogacy contracts and the moderate reg-
ulation of their enforcement. In doing so, this Article explores the
various intrinsic contractual problems of surrogacy contracts: the
problem of unequal power of the contracting parties, the problem of
a change of heart, and the problem of changed circumstances. As
presented, the preliminary normative claim regarding these con-
tractual problems was not properly addressed by classical contract
law. However, with the development of modern contract law, we are
now supplied with a well-equipped framework and doctrines appro-
priate for dealing with such problems. In order to demonstrate my
innovation, I will represent one main solution that the modern con-
tract law gives us for each given contractual problem. The Article
concludes with an appeal to legislatures and courts for a legal frame-
work and a suggested outline of the practical administrative-legal
mechanisms for accomplishing the complete legal and social recog-
nition of surrogacy contracts.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the most fascinating and challenging, as well as prob-
lematic, issues in family law is the question of the legality of surrogacy
contracts. The practice of surrogacy is slowly becoming more accepted
and welcomed, both theoretically and practically, in the U.S and var-
ious countries throughout the world.1 However, this acceptance of
the surrogacy practice and the intense public global debate regarding
the ethical, social, and economic aspects of it only serve to emphasize
the legal silence on this issue in the vast majority of U.S. jurisdictions.
Today this silence is the source of uncertainty and many ethical and
legal difficulties that block the way for those living in the U.S. and for
whom this practice represents one of their last chances to become
parents. As a result, time and time again, disputes regarding these
legal difficulties reach U.S. courts, but unfortunately, courts are not
equipped with a coherent and comprehensive framework to success-
fully cope with them.
Moreover, this silence also causes vagueness and additional pit-
falls concerning international surrogacy contracts entered into with
1. Sarah Mortazavi, It Takes a Village to Make a Child: Creating Guidelines for
International Surrogacy, 100 GEO. L.J. 2249, 2250 (2012).
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third parties located outside of the U.S. This legal limbo concerning
the legality of such surrogacy contracts or the recognition of the le-
gal parenthood of the intending parents harms the parties to these
contracts, and even more so the child who is the subject of such a
contract.2 Such children may consequently suffer from years of strug-
gling with vagueness and uncertainty concerning an issue so basic
as who his legal parents are, especially during his first years, when
certainty and stability are so important for his development. The sur-
rogacy laws of the various states of the U.S. that do exist vary from
one state to another, and the spectrum of the opinions is very wide,
from total prohibition with criminal sanctions,3 to moderate regulation
to freedom of contract and recognition of the legal parenthood of the
intending parents.4 This wide range of laws has already received the
notion of “jurisdictional chaos.”5 The current body of research litera-
ture typically categorizes these varied jurisdictional opinions concern-
ing the surrogacy contracts into four categories: prohibition, inaction,
status regulation, and contractual ordering.6
A review of the various U.S. jurisdictions’ laws shows that the
most common category is a policy of totally ignoring the surrogacy
practice altogether. Thus, the dilemmas of the legality of the surro-
gacy contract and its enforceability are left to be determined by the
judiciary on a case-by-case basis, and each case under its special cir-
cumstances. Therefore, the main goal of this research is to convey
to legislators and judges in the vast majority of the U.S. states which
have not yet addressed the urgent social and legal need the impor-
tance of giving the surrogacy contract full recognition. It is my opinion,
2. See Brock A. Patton, Buying a Newborn: Globalization and the Lack of Federal
Regulation of Commercial Surrogacy Contracts, 79 UMKC L. REV. 507, 528 (2010).
3. Id. at 514–17.
4. Id. at 518–22.
5. See Katherine Drabiak et al., Ethics, Law and Commercial Surrogacy: A Call for
Uniformity, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 300, 302–03 (2007).
6. See, e.g., Radhika Rao, Surrogacy Law in the United States: The Outcome of
Ambivalence, in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 23 (Rachel Cook
et al. eds., 2003). Even within the U.S. states that recognize freedom of contract concerning
surrogacy contracts can be found different attitude towards the scope and strength of this
freedom—whether the intentional parenthood of the intending parents will be recognized
and if any judicial preauthorized measures are necessary. For those additional categories,
see Carla Spivack, The Law of Surrogate Motherhood in the United States, 58 AM. J. COMP.
L. 97, 102–07 (2010) (parenthood by intent and parenthood by contract); Patton, supra
note 2, at 514–19 (2010) (moderate regulation, judicial preauthorization, and complete
ban). For those categories in the jurisdiction of states outside the U.S., see Patton, supra
note 2, at 522–25. For slightly different categories, see Dominique Ladomato, Protecting
Traditional Surrogacy Contracting Through Fee Payment Regulation, 23 HASTINGS
WOMEN’S L.J. 245, 250–57 (2012). For the purposes of our discussion the most important
categories are: “surrogacy contracts are unenforceable in court” and “surrogacy contracts
are legally recognized.”
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as conveyed in this Article, that the time has arrived to give surro-
gacy contracts full legal recognition, and even enforceability, under
certain circumstances as set forth in detail below.
For the clarification of our discussion, I pause here for a moment
and briefly define two types of surrogacy: traditional surrogacy and
gestational surrogacy. Traditional surrogacy means that the surro-
gate mother provides two components of motherhood: the genetic
material of the ovum and the gestational contribution.7 The gesta-
tional surrogate provides only one component of motherhood: the
gestational contribution.8
Both types of surrogacies may be either commercial or altruistic.
In the first scenario the central incentive of the surrogate mother is
the monetary consideration she receives for her part, while in the
latter surrogacy the incentive is the desire to help desperate infer-
tile couples. In the Article, I focus on commercial surrogacy since it
raises the most troubling implications, which I will elaborate upon
later on in my Article. I do not, however, distinguish between the tra-
ditional and gestational surrogacies since my general argument is
consistent and applicable to both surrogacy types (despite the fact that
there is some difference between them) because the gestational con-
tribution of the gestational surrogate mother is so great that it creates
similar complications as those that arise in a traditional surrogacy.
The issues regarding the legitimacy and enforceability of new
reproductive technologies are not new. Initially, the vast majority
of fertility treatments also suffered from bad “labor pains,” and the
first children born of them suffered unrighteously from the stigma
of illegitimacy.9 However, eventually society assimilated its under-
standing of these fertility treatments and their potential benefits,
and the legal system followed in kind, reaching the conclusion that
such treatments are totally legitimate and the children need not suf-
fer due to the means their parents had chosen to bring them into to
the world.10 In this Article I will explore the “labor pains” that sur-
rogacy contracts still suffer from in the vast majority of states in the
U.S. These labor pains are causing harm to the contracting parties,
and suffering to the resulting children who are the subject of such
contracts and suffer from the stigma of illegitimacy based on how
they were born into this world.11
7. See Ladomato, supra note 6, at 247.
8. Id. at 247–48.
9. Richard Storrow, “The Phantom Children of the Republic”: International Surrogacy
and the New Illegitimacy, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 561, 565–66 (2012).
10. See Ladomato, supra note 6, at 247.
11. See Storrow, supra note 9, at 56.
2014] IN DEFENSE OF SURROGACY AGREEMENTS 427
Presently, there is much scholarly literature that endorses the
understanding that, when faced with the dilemma of which system
of law should govern surrogacy contracts, family law or contract law,
the latter should prevail. This prevalent rationale is premised upon
an economic analysis of surrogacy contracts,12 as well as the claim
that this must be so due to, inter alia, the superiority of the contrac-
tual paradigm in the surrogacy field.13 Yet, the central contention of
this rationale is based upon the significant, yet insufficiently ex-
plored, claim that modern, and not traditional, classical contract law
should govern the legality and enforcement of surrogacy contracts.
The flexibility of modern contract law may successfully cope with
the classical intrinsic contractual problems that opponents have
argued based on classical contract law.
In building the infrastructure of my contention that surrogacy
contracts should be permissible and enforceable due to the develop-
ments of modern contract law, in Part I I will recount the very first
days of the surrogacy practice as a problematic and socially, legally,
and ethically rejected practice. Then, in Part II, I will normatively
explore the various intrinsic contractual problems of surrogacy con-
tracts while elaborating on each of those practical problems. The
problems are: unequal power of the contracting parties, change of
heart, and changed circumstances. It should be noted here that while
it is apparent that one may find numerous additional ethical and
legal problems, those additional (and more minor) problems are out-
side the scope of this research. In Part III, I describe the dramatic
revolution that has recently occurred in the realm of surrogacy,
which has changed it from a problematic and rejected practice, to a
widespread socially and legally accepted practice.
In Part IV, I explore the solution that modern contract law of-
fers to the various intrinsic contractual problems inherent in surro-
gacy contracts. There, I lay out my argument that while contractual
12. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement,
81 VA. L. REV. 2305, 2308 (1995); Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics
of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 323 (1978) (arguing that a free baby market
is better that the existing regulated market and it will maximize the benefit for all the
sides); Richard A. Posner, The Ethics and Economics of Enforcing Contracts of Surrogate
Motherhood, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 21, 21 (1989); Richard A. Posner, Adoption
and Market Theory: The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. REV. 59, 60
(1987) and in length RICHARD POSNER, SEX AND REASON 405–20 (1992) (opposing the
common laws and rhetoric against baby selling and noting that in reality a free baby
market indeed exists but is unjust and inefficient).
13. See, e.g., June Carbone, The Role of Contract Principles in Determining the Validity
of Surrogacy Contracts, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 581, 583 (1988) (arguing contract law
is appropriate for surrogacy agreements); see also Elizabeth A. Erikson, Note, Contracts
to Bear a Child, 66 CAL. L. REV. 611, 621–22 (1978) (arguing contracts to bear a child,
if properly regulated, pose no serious threat to social interests and should be permitted).
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problems were indeed significant based on classical contract law,
modern contract law now supplies us with the necessary doctrines
and a well-equipped framework essential to dealing appropriately
with such problems. In demonstrating my innovation I represent
one main solution that modern contract law gives us for each given
contractual problem. In Part V, I then conclude this Article, articu-
lating the required practical administrative-legal mechanisms nec-
essary for achieving full recognition of the legality and complete social
acceptance and legitimacy of surrogacy contracts and the children
born of them.
I. THE VERY FIRST DAYS OF SURROGACY—A PROBLEMATIC AND
SOCIALLY, LEGALLY, AND ETHICALLY REJECTED PRACTICE
The surrogacy practice, which is more a social than a medico-
legal arrangement, is well documented as far back as the Biblical
period and even further back to the period of the patriarchs.14 But
in the modern times, this practice was only first exposed to the
American public’s attention approximately twenty-five years ago
with the heart-wrenching verdict of Baby M. This legal dispute
between the surrogate mother and the intending parents erupted
into a social, legal, and media storm.15 During this period, other docu-
mented difficult surrogacy incidents occurred, including the case of
Baby Cotton in England,16 as well other less sensationalized contro-
versies in the U.S.17 In addition, the first verdicts that were given
in the U.S. held that the surrogacy contracts in question were void
14. For a survey of various Biblical sources and the statement that surrogacy in this
pattern was common amongst mankind during centuries, see Joseph Schenker, Legitimis-
ing Surrogacy In Israel: Religious Perspective, in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: INTERNA-
TIONAL PERSPECTIVES 243, 243 (Rachel Cook et al. eds., 2003). For a survey of different
surrogacy contracts that were signed during the first half of the previous century and
for the divided opinions regarding whether those contracts were indeed an adoption agree-
ment or a child custody agreement, see Hutton Brown et al., Legal Rights and Issues
Surrounding Conception, Pregnancy and Birth, 39 VAND. L. REV. 597, 645–50 (1986).
15. See Matter of Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). A testimony for the importance
of this verdict can be found in the fact that this verdict is cited to by dozens of other ver-
dicts and hundreds of academic articles. For a summary, see J. Herbie Difonzo & Ruth
C. Stern, The Children of Baby M., 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 345, 349 (2011).
16. Diana Brahams, The Hasty British Ban on Commercial Surrogacy, 17 HASTINGS
CTR. REPORT 16 (1987). For the negative impact of this case on British legislature in
articulating the surrogacy law just after the outburst of this heart-wrenching case, see
Patton, supra note 2, at 524.
17. For a list of several cases that have dealt with those incidents, see Leslie Bender,
Genes, Parents, and Assisted Reproductive Technologies: ARTs, Mistakes, Sex, Race, &
Law, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 10 n. 26 (2003). The most important ones are Stiver v.
Parker, 975 F.2d 261 (6th Cir. 1992); Huddleston v. Infertility Ctr. of America, Inc., 700
A.2d 453 (Pa. 1997); R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790 (Mass. 1998).
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or prohibited and against the public policy due to prevailing crimi-
nal laws that prohibit any sort of trafficking of babies.
This contention was based on the following arguments:18 it is
totally prohibited to pay money in exchange for child custody; there
is a general prohibition against taking children away from their bio-
logical parents without any urgent need, and prior to ensuring that
the biological parents agreed of their free will to the irreversible adop-
tion of their child; surrogacy contracts contradict, on the one hand,
the existing need to establish the disability or abusive nature of the
biological parents prior to taking their child away from them and, on
the other hand, fail to inspect the suitability and ability of the intend-
ing parents (as is necessary in the case of the adoption process).19 In
other decisions, courts have concluded that surrogacy contracts are
not necessarily illegal and void since there are several substantial
differences between surrogacy and child trafficking, and rather that
such contracts are voidable.20
Thus, even today, the attitude towards the practice of surrogacy
both inside and outside the U.S., unfortunately, is still ambivalent
at best, and many researchers and judges oppose freedom of contract
concerning this issue.21 Furthermore, in many countries outside the
U.S. the practice of surrogacy is totally prohibited and surrogacy con-
tracts are void, and in several countries criminal sanctions are also
applied. This is true with a non-altruistic, commercial surrogacy.22
18. See, e.g., Doe v. Attorney General, 487 N.W.2d 484, 486–87 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992);
R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790 (Mass. 1998). The court enumerated several public interests
which hold that those contracts are void—avoiding the negotiability and tradability of kids
as goods; the best interests of the child; avoiding the exploitation of women, etc. For a re-
cent case that holds that surrogacy contracts are void since they against the public policy,
see J.F. v. D.B., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th 1, 12–16 (Ct. Com. Pl. 2004).
19. See Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1248; see also Doe v. Kelley, 307 N.W.2d 438 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1981). For a survey of the cases where courts held that those contracts are unenforce-
able, see Brown et al., supra note 14, at 652–57.
20. See Matter of Adoption of Baby Girl L.J., 505 N.Y.S.2d 813, 817 (N.Y. Sur. 1986);
see also Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d
209, 213 (Ky. 1986) (noting public interests in promoting adoption, helping infertile couples
and the surrogate’s informed consent justified a constitutional justification to void the
surrogate’s parental rights).
21. For the argument that the majority of the academic and judicial opinions held
that those contracts are voidable, see Craig W. Christensen, Legal Ordering of Family
Values: The Case of Gay and Lesbian Families, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1299, 1350 nn.
303–04 (1997). For a list of leading cases where the freedom of contract to establish the
parenthood of the child was rejected for several reasons, see Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d
760, 765 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1994); see also In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893,
900 (Ct. App. 1994). Following the court’s rejection of the surrogacy contract, the court
needed to determine who would then become the legal parents of the child. See, e.g.,
Matter of Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J.1988); Syrkowski v. Appleyard, 362 N.W.2d 211,
213 (Mich. 1985); Doe v. Doe, 710 A.2d 1297, 1319–22 (Conn. 1998).
22. For a survey of the negative legal attitudes towards the surrogacy inside and
outside the U.S., see, e.g., Patton, supra note 2, at 514–15, 523. Some scholars contend
430 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 20:423
Therefore, it is not surprising that only recently some tragic inter-
national lawsuits took place when infertile citizens were forced to fly
overseas in search of a friendlier jurisdiction, like India, that would
allow them to use surrogacy to have a baby. However, since their
home jurisdiction did not recognize the legality of surrogacy contracts,
a miserable international saga was initiated regarding whether and
how these couples could acquire citizenship for their child in their
home country, which prohibited the practice of surrogacy in the first
place, and therefore did not recognize the child as their legal child.23
II. THE VARIOUS INTRINSIC CONTRACTUAL PROBLEMS OF
SURROGACY CONTRACTS
A. The Problem of Unequal Power of the Contracting Parties
One of the central academic arguments against the legality of
surrogacy contracts is rooted in the fear of conceptualization and
ordering in terms and measures of the free commercial market in so
sensitive a field as bringing a child to the world. In general, when
dealing with agreements and contracts that regulate the legal par-
enthood of those who use fertility treatments there is often the con-
tention that the forces of the free market in this unique context will
worsen the existing racial and economic discrimination against in-
ferior social groups.24 This worry stems from the involvement of the
big and “easy” money involved in such an intimate and seductive
issue such that it may cause some individuals, especially women, to
take on unreasonable contractual obligations that contradict their
own interests due to the monetary temptation.
Furthermore, there is the claim that often in the fertility busi-
ness the selling party is economically inferior compared to the buying
party.25 The implication of this contention in contractual terminology
that most European countries and some countries in Asia ban surrogacy and that Italy,
Norway, Spain, France and Germany are among the many countries that have entirely
prohibited surrogacy. See, respectively, Storrow, supra note 9, at 595–99; Mortazavi,
supra note 1, at 2273.
23. Mortazavi, supra note 1, at 2274–77.
24. See Michael J. Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets,
Lecture at Brasenose College, Oxford (May 11–12, 1998), in THE TANNER LECTURES ON
HUMAN VALUES 89, 94–96 (1998). For more on this point, see I. Glenn Cohen, The Price
of Everything, the Value of Nothing: Reframing the Commodification Debate, 117 HARV.
L. REV. 689, 690–91 (2003); see also Elizabeth S. Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics of
Commodification, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 112–17 (2009).
25. See Sonia M. Suter, Giving in to Baby Markets: Regulation Without Prohibition, 16
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 217, 236 nn. 93–97 (2009). Concerning the worry of the exploitation
of the surrogate mother by the intending parents due to the money involved in the bargain
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is that the a priori unequal socio-economic power of the contracting
parties will result in unequal and discriminative clauses against the
emotionally, economically, and socially weaker party, and that this
is true due to the manipulations and actions that the superior party
can make during the negotiation that will end in inequity and dam-
age to the inferior party.26 This fear is even worse when we are dealing
with the inferior classes of society, which in the international con-
text means citizens of third world countries, especially India,27 who
may make wrong decisions due to the strong economic temptation.
Thus, the existing gap between unequal bargaining powers of indi-
viduals, groups, and even different countries will be further deepened.
This intensified gap may cause a draconian economic and emotional
exploitation of one of the parties28 that will likely fuel the existing call
to make all surrogacy contracts void.
Practically speaking, in the specific context of surrogacy contracts,
some researchers claim that the intending parents and the surrogate
mother belong to different socio-economic classes, an argument which
that makes free will impossible, see, respectively, Doe v. Attorney General, 487 N.W.2d
484, 487 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); Matter of Adoption of Paul, 550 N.Y.S.2d 815, 817 (N.Y.
Fam. Ct. 1990). For a summary of this fear, see Jennifer Rimm, Booming Baby Business:
Regulating Commercial Surrogacy in India, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1429, 1443–49 (2009).
26. See Molly J. Walker Wilson, Precommitment in Free-Market Procreation: Surrogacy,
Commissioned Adoption, and Limits on Human Decision Making Capacity, 31 J. LEGIS.
329, 341 (2005) and at length Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism
Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 635 (1999).
27. For the ethical-legal problem and for the urgent need of international regulation
of surrogacy contracts in order to avoid the exploitation of surrogate mothers in the third
world, see Kristiana Brugger, International Law in the Gestational Surrogacy Debate, 35
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 665, 670–76 (2012); Seema Mohapatra, Stateless Babies & Adoption
Scams: A Bioethical Analysis of International Commercial Surrogacy, 30 BERKELEY J.
INT’L L. 412, 432–37, 441–48 (2012); Emily Stehr, International Surrogacy Contract
Regulation: National Governments’ and International Bodies’ Misguided Quests to
Prevent Exploitation, 35 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 253, 266–67 (2012). For the
goal of the American legislation to save the surrogate mother from any possible exploi-
tation, see Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act 6, 9B U.L.A. 265 (2001)
(repealed 2000) and the editors’ comments therein.
28. For the problem of exploitation in general and specifically in the context of sur-
rogacy contracts, see John L. Hill, Exploitation, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 631, 637–44, 691–95
(1994); see also Alan Wertheimer, Two Questions About Surrogacy and Exploitation, 21
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 211, 211 (1992). For a call to invalidate any distress exploitation con-
tract in the American contract law, see Shahar Lifshitz, Distress Exploitation Contracts
in the Shadow of No Duty to Rescue, 86 N.C. L. REV. 315 (2008). In the context of surrogacy
contracts, feminist critics often speak about the fear of exploiting the surrogate mother
as an individual and as a woman, see Anita L. Allen, Surrogacy, Slavery, and the Owner-
ship of Life, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 139, 147–48 (1990); see also Shari O’Brien,
Commercial Conceptions: A Breeding Ground for Surrogacy, 65 N.C. L. REV. 127, 128
(1986). For a summary of the same from almost twenty years ago, see Christine L. Kerian,
Surrogacy: A Last Resort Alternative for Infertile Women or a Commodification of Women’s
Bodies and Children?, 12 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 113, 153–55, 161–64 (1997).
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may be strengthened by further empirical studies.29 This reality di-
rectly leads us to the fear that the gap between the contracting parties’
bargaining powers will wrongly influence the surrogate mother, since
she will be exposed to strong temptations and therefore her free will
and informed consent will be compromised.30 Some scholars even
contend that due to this issue any freedom of contract should be pro-
hibited since the clear inequality of bargaining powers will likely
lead to the obvious exploitation of the surrogate mother.31
In the past, this criticism was used as a mechanism to defend
American minorities, such as Latinos and African-Americans,32 but
recently this rationale has been applied to the flourishing surrogacy
business in India, where the huge gap between the western, white,
well-educated, and rich intending parents and the native, uneducated,
and poor surrogate mother is well-known.33 In any case, these fears
and the related rationale preclude any private ordering of the surro-
gacy business from the outset. Thus, due to the economic inequity
of bargaining powers and the fear that the surrogate mother will be
racially, economically, and emotionally exploited by the intending
parents, the conclusion follows that we should not recognize the legal-
ity of surrogacy contracts and that we cannot enforce them either.34
29. For a survey of studies that document the socio-economic gap between the intend-
ing parents and the surrogate mother, see Glenda Labadie-Jackson, The Reproductive
Rights of Latinas and Commercial Surrogacy Contracts—English Translation, 14 TEX.
HISP. J.L. & POL’Y 49, 61 n. 114 (2008).
30. For a similar argument, see MARY L. SHANLEY, MAKING BABIES, MAKING FAMILIES:
WHAT MATTERS MOST IN AN AGE OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, SURROGACY, ADOPTION,
AND SAME-SEX AND UNWED PARENTS 104, 107 (2001); see also Nicole M. Healy, Beyond
Surrogacy: Gestational Parenting Agreements Under California Law, 1 UCLA WOMEN’S
L.J. 89, 111 n. 94 (1991). For different studies that deal with the unequal bargaining
powers in the surrogacy contracts, see Malina Coleman, Gestation, Intent, and the Seed:
Defining Motherhood in the Era of Assisted Human Reproduction, 17 CARDOZO L. REV.
497, 524 n. 154 (1996).
31. For a survey of the possible problematic economic exploitation of the surrogate
mother, see Labadie-Jackson, supra note 29, at 60–62.
32. See, e.g., Beverly Horsburgh, Jewish Women, Black Women: Guarding Against
the Oppression of Surrogacy, 8 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 29, 48–54 (1993); see also Anita
L. Allen, The Black Surrogate Mother, 8 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 17, 18–19 (1991).
33. See the various studies in supra note 27. See also Rimm, supra note 25, at 1430;
Usha Rengachary Smerdon, Crossing Bodies, Crossing Borders: International Surrogacy
Between the United States and India, 39 CUMB. L. REV. 15, 54 (2008).
34. For the problem of the unequal bargaining powers and the strong fear that the
surrogate mother will be exploited in addition to other concerns, and a call to promote a
surrogate-focused model in order to overcome those problems, see respectively, Catherine
London, Advancing a Surrogate-Focused Model of Gestational Surrogacy Contracts, 18
CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 391, 392 (2012); Austin Caster, Don’t Split the Baby: How the
U.S. Could Avoid Uncertainty and Unnecessary Litigation and Promote Equality by
Emulating the British Surrogacy Law Regime, 10 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 477, 479 (2011).
2014] IN DEFENSE OF SURROGACY AGREEMENTS 433
B. The Problem of Change of Heart
Opponents of surrogacy agreements claim that the questions
regarding the legality and the enforcement of surrogacy contracts
are vague due to other ramifications of unequal bargaining power,
which lead to the problem of changes of heart. This criticism focuses
on the monetary consideration that is paid for the surrogacy and
may lead some contracting parties to compromise their free will and
informed consent due to the strong temptation to earn “easy” and
large sums of money for selling their procreational abilities, or even
their baby.35 Furthermore, opponents propound that this problem
may lead to an inability to fulfill their contractual obligations later
on. This is especially true, as mentioned above, if one of the contract-
ing parties belongs to the lower socio-economic groups and takes on
unreasonable contractual obligations due to the big and “easy” money
she can make. Thus, this intrinsic problem may drive that individual
to try and evade the contract following her initial inability to foresee
her eventual emotional condition and the circumstances that will
follow the performance of the contract and a possible claim for change
of heart.
The problem of changes of heart is an issue that may arise in
any contractual agreement, but due to the unique characteristics of
long-term contracts, such as the surrogacy contracts, which are very
popular in the modern era, this problem becomes even more prevalent.
Every contract by its nature carries with it a level of uncertainty.
However, the long-term contract raises some additional problems
with special traits; the most important problem, for our discussion,
is the limited cognitive discretion of the contracting parties to prop-
erly calculate and evaluate their undertakings. One can count on the
following difficulties: the difficulty to properly evaluate future risks36
and the difficulty in obtaining all relevant information and reason-
ably analyzing it.37
35. See, e.g., SHANLEY, supra note 30, at 107–11. For the last contention, see Matter
of Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1245–46 (N.J. 1998).
36. See Richard E. Speidel, Court-Imposed Price Adjustments under Long-Term
Supply Contracts, 76 NW. U.L. REV. 369, 373 (1981); Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and
Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory
Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 624–29 (1982); ROBYN M.
DAWES, RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 92–94 (1988); Thomas S. Ulen,
Cognitive Imperfections and the Economic Analysis of Law, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 385, 386
(1989); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Relational Contracts, in GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN CONTRACT
LAW 291, 301 (Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedmann eds., 1995).
37. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47
STAN. L. REV. 211, 232–40 (1995) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Limits of Cognition]; see also
Shawn J. Bayern, Rational Ignorance, Rational Closed-Mindedness, and Modern Economic
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It is evident that when additional cognitive difficulties exist prior
to the contract being signed, the fear of change of heart becomes in-
creasingly more problematic due to the difficulties involved in per-
forming on the contract. These unique difficulties are well known in
modern contract law, which therefore supplies us with a variety of
tools and doctrines dedicated to overcoming such problems.38 It is
worth noting that classical contract law traditionally considered
neither change of heart problems nor supplied any coherent frame-
work to deal with them. The criticism of classical contract law’s illu-
sion of the contracting parties’ rationality is strengthened in light
of the behavioral economics paradigm, which holds that a human
being is not acting rationally, especially when the period of time for
contract performance gets longer.39 This is true due to the following
justifications: as the time period for a contract’s performance gets
longer, the illusive optimisms are bigger; there is a tendency to as-
sume that the current conditions will last in the future, but as time
passes, the less likely such assumption will hold true.
If this is not enough, the intention, which is the foundation of
the contract, is changeable by its virtue. We are always changing
our minds concerning our decisions with respect to performing or
not performing on contractual undertakings. When we are dealing
with obligations that take place in the open market, the results of
any change of heart, very often are not so draconian, since only
monetary compensation is at hand.40 However, in the intimate con-
text, there are often very important personal and familial ramifica-
tions to a change of heart. For example: an agreement to break up and
get divorced,41 the desire of a pregnant woman to abort her fetus,42
the withdrawal of biological parents from their initial agreement for
the adoption of their child.43
There is no doubt that surrogacy contracts embody this problem
more than other contracts due to the special cognitive difficulty in
Formalism in Contract Law, 97 CAL. L. REV. 943, 945 (2009). For a wider view of this
problem see the studies enumerated there at 943 n. 1.
38. Eisenberg, Limits of Cognition, supra note 37, at 212–13.
39. Ulen, supra note 36, at 386.
40. For a general survey of the right of the contracting parties to regret the first
agreement, see ALLAN E. FARNSWORTH, CHANGING YOUR MIND: THE LAW OF REGRETTED
DECISIONS (1998).
41. For the argument that if it is possible to break up the marriage, there is no justi-
fication to block the surrogate mother from breaching the surrogacy contract, especially
when the child is not about to be handed to his biological parents, see Anita L. Allen,
Privacy, Surrogacy, and the Baby M Case, 76 GEO. L.J. 1759, 1779 n. 99 (1988).
42. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn-
sylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
43. Brian Bix, Domestic Agreements, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1753, 1769 (2007) [herein-
after Bix, Domestic Agreements].
2014] IN DEFENSE OF SURROGACY AGREEMENTS 435
foreseeing the emotional condition of the surrogate mother when she
will be asked to hand over the child she carried to the intending
parents. In the scholarly literature there are many psychological
and physiological justifications for the surrogate mother’s ability to
change her mind and not fulfill her contractual obligations.44 Simi-
larly, there are potential circumstances when the intending parents
will ask to void the contract and not take the child following their
dissatisfaction in the resulting child (e.g., he was born ill, or is not
perfect in their eyes for some reason).
Still, it is apparent that the issue of changes of heart is a bigger
problem with respect to the surrogate mother. Thus, inter alia, it
may be argued that there is an almost mystical bond that exists be-
tween the surrogate mother and the fetus.45 Similarly, there is an
intrinsic inability to foresee, ex ante when signing the contract, what
the surrogate mother’s emotional and physical condition will be fol-
lowing the delivery, which can easily make fulfillment of the con-
tract impossible for her.46 Therefore, for many scholars there is no
a priori real option for the surrogate mother’s free will and informed
consent, which means that the legality and enforceability of surro-
gacy contracts are doubtful at best.47
This problem is even worse and brings into question the possi-
bility of enforcing the contract when the surrogate mother changes
her mind and asks to keep the child.48 This issue is well articulated
44. See Margaret F. Brinig, A Maternalistic Approach to Surrogacy: Comment on
Richard Epstein’s Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REV.
2377, 2381, 2383–84 (1995).
45. Id. at 2383 n. 22.
46. Id. at 2388–92. For a further discussion of this problematic contention, see Walker
Wilson, supra note 26. For more on this issue, see A.H.W. v. G.H.B., 772 A.2d 948, 953
(2000). A similar argument was brought and discussed by Lori B. Andrews, Surrogate
Motherhood: The Challenge for Feminists, in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 167, 172–73
(Larry Gostin ed., 1990); see also Jessica H. Munyon, Protectionism and Freedom of
Contract: The Erosion of Female Autonomy in Surrogacy Decisions, 36 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 717, 719 (2003).
47. See Scott B. Rae, Parental Rights and the Definition of Motherhood in Surrogate
Motherhood, 3 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 219, 269–70 (1994); Martha A. Field,
Giving the Mother the Right to Renounce the Contract, in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD:
POLITICS AND PRIVACY 97–109 (Larry Gostin ed., 1990); Mellisa Lane, Ethical Issues in
Surrogacy Arrangements, in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
127, 129 (Rachel Cook et al. eds., 2003).
48. This issue has been discussed in many articles and judicial opinions. See
FARNSWORTH, supra note 40. For an additional sources, see Elizabeth J. Samuels, Time
to Decide? The Laws Governing Mothers’ Consents to the Adoption of Their Newborn
Infants, 72 TENN. L. REV. 509, 539–48 (2005); Bix, Domestic Agreements, supra note 43,
at 1769. For a list of studies and cases that deal with the dilemma of enforcing a sur-
rogacy contract on surrogate mother, see Marla J. Hollandsworth, Gay Men Creating
Families Through Surro-Gay Arrangements: A Paradigm for Reproductive Freedom, 3
AM. U. J. GENDER & LAW 183, 185 n. 3, 186 n. 5 (1995). For a list of researchers who
436 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 20:423
in all American jurisdictions that prohibit by law biological parents
from agreeing to the adoption of their fetus prior to delivery. Thus,
even going as far back as two decades ago, the various U.S. jurisdic-
tions prohibited pregnant women from irrevocably agreeing to hand
over their fetus for adoption before the delivery, and even before the
mandatory cooling period is over.49
Similarly, in the current body of U.S. law one can already find
the implication of the understanding that due to the fear that the
surrogate mother will change her mind, the surrogate contract is
not enforceable, at least not until the cooling period is over. In one
of the very first surrogacy cases dealt with by the U.S. court system,
the court concluded that the surrogate mother’s informed consent
would be exceptionally problematic until the cooling period is over.50
Moreover, in other cases that dealt with the mutual request of the con-
tracting parties to write the names of the intending parents in the
child’s birth certificate before the delivery, U.S. courts have made con-
tradictory decisions and have not always approved such requests.51
C. The Problem of Changed Circumstances
In addition to the two problems intrinsic to surrogacy contracts
that are discussed above, there is another external, acute problem
that must be addressed. This is the problem of changed circum-
stances, which occurs when extreme unseen circumstances not in
the control of the contracting parties come into play following the
contract’s execution, and in some cases, causes a withdrawal of their
contractual obligations.52 This problem becomes even more compli-
cated when dealing with contracts that govern intimate issues such
contend the insufficiency of the contractual ordering in determining legal motherhood
by surrogacy contracts and therefore feel those contracts should be void, see Healy, supra
note 30, at 108 n. 87.
49. For the view that a surrogacy contract is indeed a pro-delivery adoption, see, e.g.,
Liezl Van Zyl, Intentional Parenthood: Responsibilities in Surrogate Motherhood, 10
HEALTH CARE ANALYSIS 165, 168–72 (2002). For a survey of those arguments, see Danny
R. Veilleux, Validity and Construction of Surrogate Parenting Agreement, 77 A.L.R. 4th
70 (2008).
50. Matter of Baby M. 537 A.2d 1227, 1248 (N.J. 1998).
51. This is the reason for the refusal of the court in A.H.W. v. G.H.B., 772 A.2d at 953,
to approve this request in contrast to the opinion of the New Jersey Attorney General. But
it is worth noting that a similar request was approved in Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess
Med. Ctr., 756 N.E.2d 1133, 1141 (Mass. 2001).
52. The problem of changed circumstances in modern contract law is well-embedded
in the following central doctrines: impossibility, frustration of purpose, and impractica-
bility. For the historical and philosophical roots of the changed circumstances doctrine,
see James Gordley, Impossibility and Changed and Unforeseen Circumstances, 52 AM.
J. COMP. L. 513, 525–30 (2004).
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as surrogacy contracts, where the cognitive ability to foresee upcom-
ing scenarios is even more limited.
Thus, extreme changed circumstances, such as the passing away
of a close relative, especially that of biological child, divorce, medical
problems, loss of legal capacity, and even death, are not tradition-
ally taken into consideration. Therefore, it is not surprising that
when the enforcement of the contract is at issue, the claim of changed
circumstances will be heard, and that the contract may be found un-
enforceable.53 Some even go so far as to argue that demanding per-
formance on the initial contract in this context is unconscionable.54
III. FROM A PROBLEMATIC AND REJECTED PRACTICE TO A
SOCIALLY AND LEGALLY WIDESPREAD AND ACCEPTED PRACTICE
In stark contrast to the criticism that I just described, and in
opposition to the very early days of the surrogacy practice, a look at
the hundreds of legal and ethical research studies that have been
published in recent decades demonstrates the recent shift and accel-
erated social and legal acceptance of the surrogacy practice. This
dramatic change was first documented in the writings of several
scholars during the nineteen-seventies, despite the fact that during
this time the prevailing opinion was that surrogacy contracts are
prohibited and unenforceable because they are unethical and im-
practical.55 From the seventies and through today, the ethical and
the legal shift is well-articulated in continually expanding academic
53. For the attempt of modern contract law to cope with the problem of changed
circumstances, and for the question of the adequacy of those doctrines in handling the
issues that arise within the context of fertility treatments, see Marjorie M. Shultz,
Reproductive Technology and the Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender
Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 349–52 (1990); see also Louis M. Seidman, Baby M
and the Problem of Unstable Preferences, 76 GEO. L. J. 1829 (1988). For a call to recognize
the legality of contracts dealing with frozen embryos only when the problem of changed
circumstances does not occur, see Mark C. Haut, Divorce and the Disposition of Frozen
Embryos, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 493, 495 (1999). For a call to enforce those contracts even in
case of changed circumstances or change of heart, see John A. Robertson, Prior Agreements
for Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 407, 411 (1990).
54. For general problems with foreseeing changed circumstances in determining legal
parenthood by agreement in private ordering of fertility treatments, see Jeremy A.
Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems of Affective Forecasting, 80 IND. L.J.
155, 209–14 (2005). For disposition agreements concerning the fate of fertilized ova in
case of disagreement between the ex-spouses due to changed circumstances, see Shelly
R. Petralia, Resolving Disputes over Excess Frozen Embryos Through the Confines of
Property and Contract Law, 17 J.L. & HEALTH 103, 128–34 (2002).
55. Erikson, supra note 13, at 611.
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writings, which also trace how the practice of surrogacy has become
socially56 and legally accepted.
Thus, if in the past the dilemma was whether surrogacy is an
ethically and socially desirable and acceptable practice, today the
question at issue is a different one. The practice of surrogacy is now
permitted; however, the dilemma now centers on the question of
how to execute such contracts in the best possible way in order to
maximize their feasibility and durability at the state,57 federal,58
and international levels.59 This shift towards the legalization of the
surrogacy practice is evident not only in theoretical studies, but also
in the practice of more and more states’ judiciaries and legislatures
aimed at abolishing or restricting the spectrum and strength of
surrogacy prohibitions.
Instead, the practice of surrogacy has become more or less al-
lowed in various jurisdictions.60 Expert committees in various states
no longer reject the practice from the outset, but instead make it pos-
sible even if it is the least-preferable option.61 A reading of the Uni-
form Acts also supports this conclusion. While in 1988 the Uniform
Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act (USCACA) considered
the enforcement of surrogacy contracts as just an option, in 2002 the
56. See Rachel Cook et al., Introduction, in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES 1 n. 2 (Rachel Cook et al. eds., 2003); see also Heather A. Crews, Women
Be Warned, Egg Donation Isn’t All It’s Cracked Up to Be: The Copulation of Science and
the Courts Makes Multiple Mommies, 7 N.C.J.L. & TECH. 141, 141–42 (2005).
57. See, e.g., London, supra note 34, at 410–14; see also Peter H. Schuck, The Social
Utility of Surrogacy, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 132, 136 (1990). For an opinion that rec-
ognizes intentional parenthood as standing as the base of the surrogacy contract in rec-
ognizing the dual fatherhood of two homosexuals, see Perri Koll, The Use of the Intent
Doctrine to Expand the Rights of Intended Homosexual Male Parents in Surrogacy
Custody Disputes, 18 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 199, 201 (2011); Anne R. Dana, The State
of Surrogacy Laws: Determining Legal Parentage for Gay Fathers, 18 DUKE J. GENDER
L. & POL’Y 353, 382–85 (2011); Yehezkel Margalit, Intentional Parenthood: A Solution
to the Plight of Same-Sex Partners Striving for Legal Recognition as Parents, 12 WHITTIER
J. OF CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 39 (2013).
58. See, e.g., Caster, supra note 34; Emily Gelmann, “I’m Just the Oven, It’s Totally
Their Bun”: The Power and Necessity of the Federal Government to Regulate Commercial
Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements and Protect the Legal Rights of Intended Parents,
32 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 159, 161 (2011); Patton, supra note 2.
59. See, e.g., Barbara Stark, Transnational Surrogacy and International Human Rights
Law, 18 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 369, 371 (2012); Stehr, supra note 27, at 271–72; Brugger,
supra note 27, at 686–98.
60. For the contention that even a few years ago, half the American states that have
legislated surrogacy laws recognize the legality of surrogacy contracts, see, e.g., Katherine
M. Swift, Parenting Agreements, The Potential Power of Contract, and the Limits of
Family Law, 34 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 913, 925 n. 48 (2007).
61. See MARGARET BRAZIER ET AL., DEPT. OF HEALTH SURROGACY, REVIEW FOR HEALTH
MINISTERS OF CURRENT ARRANGEMENTS FOR PAYMENTS AND REGULATION, REPORT OF THE
REVIEW TEAM 68 (1998); see also BRITISH MEDICAL ASS’N, CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF
MOTHERHOOD—THE PRACTICE OF SURROGACY IN BRITAIN 7, 20–22 (1996).
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Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) went so far as to fully recognize ges-
tational surrogacy.62 In addition to the increased recognition of in-
tentional parenthood, which stands as the base of the surrogacy
contract as held in several California verdicts, two additional states
to date, Nevada and Arkansas,63 now explicitly recognize in their
legislation the applicability of the contractual paradigm in legaliz-
ing surrogacy contracts.
Furthermore, several American states have recognized the le-
gality of surrogacy contracts, albeit with some restrictions. These
states include: Florida, Illinois, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and
Virginia.64 In addition, Texas and Tennessee have partial surrogacy
regimes that leave whether surrogacy contracts will eventually be
enforced unclear.65 Several countries outside the U.S have also
recognized the legality of both commercial and altruistic surrogacy
contracts including Russia and the Ukraine.66 Other countries only
recognize the legality of altruistic ones including Israel, Brazil,
Greece, Holland, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia.67 In
other countries such as India, China, New Zealand, and Thailand,
legislation is silent, but in practice surrogacy is widespread.68 Still,
even in states where the contractual paradigm has not been fully
recognized in determining legal parenthood following disputed or
breached surrogacy contracts, courts still consider intentional par-
enthood, i.e., the initial intention of the parties to parent the resulting
child, evinced by the entire agreement, as one of the central factors.69
This shift toward widespread acceptance of surrogacy contracts
is not only articulated in the legislative context but is also well-
documented in U.S. judicial decisions. There is an increasing num-
ber of leading cases that have concluded that surrogacy contracts
are legal and enforceable.70 In addition, some seminal verdicts have
62. See USCACA § 5–9 (2001); UPA § 801 (amended 2002). The latter unified proposal
explicitly recognizes the legality of surrogacy contracts, therefore § 602(7) recognizes the
right of the intending parents to apply to the court for any parenthood claim proceedings.
63. See Amy M. Larkey, Redefining Motherhood: Determining Legal Maternity in
Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 605, 624 (2003). This under-
standing is well documented in Arkansas’ legislation—A.C.A. § 9-10-201 (2005)—and
explicitly in § 2 of Nevada’s legislation, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.045 (2007).
64. Larkey, supra note 63, at 629–30.
65. For a full overview, see Caster, supra note 34, at 485–91.
66. Mortazavi, supra note 1, at 2272.
67. Id. at 2270–71.
68. For a broader survey, see id. at 2270–73.
69. See Ardis L. Campbell, Determination of Status as Legal or Natural Parents in
Contested Surrogacy Births, 77 A.L.R. 5th 567, 580 (2000).
70. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 787 (Cal. 1993). A bigger innovation one can
find in this conclusion is that intentional parenthood can be established even where there
is no genetic connection between the intending parents and the child, see In re Marriage
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concluded that the coerced legal motherhood of the surrogate mother
and her inability to prove that she is not the biological mother of the
child, as opposed to a man’s parallel ability, is unconstitutional and
contradicts the Equal Protection Clause.71 This means that the sur-
rogate mother can now prove that she is not the legal mother of the
child, and it opens the gate for the claim of the intending mother
that she should be recognized as the legal mother.
It is fair to conclude that from any point of view the practice of
surrogacy has become more accepted by society, ethicists, and even
the legal system. Furthermore, it should be noted that some scholars
from the school of the economic analysis of the law strongly assert
that it is very economically efficient to enable a free market regime
and to fully legalize surrogacy agreements, as in the field of adoption.72
However, such unfettered and unregulated freedom of contract may
prove to be very dangerous and detrimental to the women and chil-
dren who are involved in surrogacy agreements. Thus, it is my con-
clusion that surrogacy agreements should be seen as legitimate and
enforceable, but premised upon a regulated, narrower notion of free-
dom of contract in order to protect the public interest.
IV. MODERN CONTRACT LAW AS A SOLUTION TO THE
VARIOUS INTRINSIC CONTRACTUAL PROBLEMS
A. General
Modern family law and modern contract law have respectively
gone through processes of specification and classification.73 The
of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 291 (1998). For a similar but less innovative decision
reached by the court, see Jaycee B. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 694, 703 (1996). In
another case the court concluded that there is no problem with $14,000 surrogacy fee
contract, see Matter of Adoption of Baby A, 877 P.2d 107, 107–08 (Or.App. 1994). In a
similar case the court invalidated a commercial surrogacy contract but agreed to validate
it under some restrictions, see Matter of Adoption of Paul, 550 N.Y.S.2d 815, 818–19 (N.Y.
Fam. Ct. 1990). In another case the court found that the contract does not contradict
public policy, see J.F. v. D.B., 879 N.E.2d 740, 741–42 (Ohio 2007). The courts in other
states have legalized surrogacy contracts, holding that the intending mother is the legal
mother of the child, see Doe v. New York City Bd. of Health, 782 N.Y.S.2d 180, 184 (2004);
see also In re Adoption of K.F.H.,844 S.W.2d 343, 344 (Ark. 1993).
71. See Soos v. Superior Court, 897 P.2d 1356, 1361 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994); J.R. v. Utah,
261 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1296 (2002); In re Roberto D.B.,923 A.2d 115, 122 (Md. 2007).
72. See the various sources enumerated in supra note 13. For a similar understanding,
see Lori B. Andrews, Beyond Doctrinal Boundaries: A Legal Framework for Surrogate
Motherhood, 81 VA. L. REV. 2343, 2354 (1995). For an updated overview of this dilemma,
see Walker Wilson, supra note 26, at 333–34.
73. See Jay M. Feinman, The Jurisprudence of Classification, 41 STAN. L. REV. 661, 675
(1989). Regarding the classification of modern contract law, many studies were published,
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specification of family law is well-illustrated by the reality that in
many states family law is no longer considered just another branch
of the legal system, rather it is allotted special treatment due to its
unique and intimate character (e.g., the existence of family law
courts). This new treatment of family law issues has in turn led to
the special legislative ordering in articulating special laws concern-
ing the spousal relationship. Similarly, in the western hemisphere,
it is very common to contend that this relationship fits well into con-
tractual ordering due to its egoistic and personal traits.74 The vast
majority of the states’ different legal ordering laws have been leg-
islated for the variety of spousal contracts,75 and in the research
literature many articles deal with the descriptive and normative
aspects of this special ordering.
The classification of contract law is well-outlined despite a special
characteristic of modern contract law which gives special emphasis
to the unique traits of each contract and to developing individualized
contract laws. But before going deeply into the description of modern
contract law’s characteristics, I want to briefly describe the histori-
cal and normative background for the layperson who is not familiar
with the nuances of the varied contract theories and the shift from
classical to modern contract law.76 Classical contract law developed
therefore I will mention only one classification concerning classical, modern, and rela-
tional contract law that I will elaborate upon further in the remaining discussion, see Ian
R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical,
Neoclassical and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U.L. REV. 854, 873 (1978) [hereinafter
Macneil, Contracts].
74. For a criticism of this point and for the fear that it will badly damage the children
specifically, and the familial realm in general, see MARGARET BRINIG, FROM CONTRACT TO
COVENANT, BEYOND THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY 1–14, 18–25, 83–109 (2000).
75. Amongst the leading articles that endorse private ordering of spousal relation-
ship, see Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital
Agreements and How We Think About Marriage, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 146 (1998)
[hereinafter Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow]; Allison A. Marston, Planning for Love: The
Politics of Prenuptial Agreements, 49 STAN. L. REV. 887, 891–92 (1997); Bix, Domestic
Agreements, supra note 43, at 1763–67; Brian H. Bix, The Public and Private Faces of
Family Law, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 295, 303–18 (2004); Margaret F. Brinig & Steven M.
Crafton, Marriage and Opportunism, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 869 (1994); Lloyd Cohen, Marriage,
Divorce, and Quasi Rents; or, “I Gave Him the Best Years of My Life,” 16 J. LEGAL STUD.
267, 271–73, 297–99 (1987); LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT: SPOUSES,
LOVERS, AND THE LAW 249–50 (1981); Marjorie M. Shultz, Contractual Ordering of
Marriage: A New Model For State Policy, 70 CAL. L. REV 204, 243–44 (1982).
76. For the overlapping meaning of modern contract law and neoclassical contract
law, see Jay M. Feinman, The Significance of Contract Theory, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283,
1285 (1990). Some scholars contend that classical contract law is the starting point for
any further theoretical discussion; therefore, I open my discussion with a description of
classical contract law. For those statements, see PATRICK S. ATIYAH, AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE LAW OF CONTRACT 7 (1995) [hereinafter ATIYAH, INTRODUCTION]; see also Melvin
A. Eisenberg, Why There Is No Law of Relational Contracts, 94 NW. U.L. REV. 805, 805
(2000) [hereinafter Eisenberg, No Law].
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in the eighteenth century and is identified with the period of Holmes,
Williston, and the Restatement (First) of Contracts.77 In the nine-
teenth century and during the first half of the twentieth century,
more accurately around the year 1870, classical contract law reached
what some call the “golden age” of contract law.78 This classical model
spoke about the sanctity of the contract and its monolithic character,
totally ignoring any special characteristics of a given contract, such
as the unequal power of the contracting parties.79
Due to the understanding that the only way to respect the con-
tracting parties as rational individuals was as autonomous agents,
the legal involvement of the legislative body and the judiciary was
very limited, except with regard to the enforcement of contracts.80 The
notion of the private and free will of contracting parties was wholly
accepted, and dictated the entire spectrum of the respective parties’
contractual obligations and rights.81 Any special external character-
istics, such as a gap between parties’ bargaining powers, were con-
sidered irrelevant, and no restrictions were considered necessary.
Since the contracting parties were treated as rational agents with
sufficient measures to properly calculate their actions, the courts
were given very narrow discretion, and their ability to intervene
was similarly limited. Only in very rare cases did a court adjust a
contract in order to account for changed circumstances. Instead,
courts would refrain from examining contracts’ components with
substantial scrutiny, thereby avoiding the invalidation of any con-
tract based on the public policy justification for enforcing contracts
as much as possible.82
With the passage of time, at the end of the nineteenth century
and in the beginning of the twentieth century, different social and
77. See Feinman, supra note 76, at 1285 n. 12.
78. See Mark Pettit, Freedom, Freedom of Contract, and the “Rise and Fall,” 79 B.U.
L. REV. 263, 299 (1999).
79. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 6 (1974); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The
Responsive Model of Contract Law, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1107, 1108 (1984); GOOD FAITH AND
FAULT IN CONTRACT LAW 7–12 (Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedmann eds., 1995). For a histor-
ical description, see LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 367 (2d 2005).
80. See PATRICK S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 217–568
(1979) [hereinafter ATIYAH, RISE AND FALL]; MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860 (1997); K.M. Sharma, From “Sanctity” to “Fairness”: An
Uneasy Transition in the Law of Contracts?, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 95, 95–
110 (1999).
81. See ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW: AN ANALYSIS AND
CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF CONTRACT LAW 11 (1997). For the importance
that the American system showed for narrowing the judicial enforcement only to the
initial agreement of the contracting parties, see FRIEDMAN, supra note 79, at 533; see also
ATIYAH, RISE AND FALL, supra note 80, at 408.
82. For the first aspect, see Jay M. Feinman & Peter Gabel, Contract Law as Ideology,
in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 373, 497 (David Kairys ed., 1990).
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economic changes lead courts to abandon the sanctity of the freedom
of contract following the understanding that there was no longer the
option of relying solely on the free will of the contracting parties.
These changes were connected to economic shifts that hurt free mar-
ket competition due to the usage of adhesion contracts in contexts
where the inherent gap between the bargaining powers prevailed. It
was concluded that permitting unfettered freedom of contract merely
widens the gap and should not continue.83 Confronting many mar-
ket regulation pitfalls, it was clear that judicial intervention would
strengthen, not weaken, genuine freedom of contract. This new con-
tention prevailed in the legislative and judicial decisions during the
twentieth century, which sought to rein in and narrowly apply the
concept of freedom of contract.84
Thus, modern contract law is sensitive to the special character-
istics of any given contract. Following the understanding that not
intervening in the contractual relationship may perpetuate the in-
equality between sides, modern contract law expects that the con-
tracting parties will honor social values and especially consider the
other party’s needs (collectivism).85 Due to the modern notion that
often there is really no freedom of contract in choosing whether to
enter into a contract to begin with, or with whom to enter into such
a contract, today the judiciary practices scrutiny and intervention
in contract stipulations in order to preserve fairness for both sides.
Courts no longer blindly follow the initial agreement, but conceptu-
alize the contract in public terms while inserting social and commu-
nal values, such as promoting fairness considerations, distributional
justice, reasonableness, expectation for collaboration, solidarity,
mutuality, and even encouragement to renegotiate in the case of
changed circumstances.86
In modern contract law, which is the prevailing philosophy in
the Anglo-American system today,87 there is a sort of withdrawal
from freedom of contract toward increasing paternalistic principles
and obligatory legislation. Courts have wide discretion and a free
hand to intervene while educating the parties and even to insert
83. ATIYAH, RISE AND FALL, supra note 80, at 409.
84. For a description of those political, social and economic shifts, see ATIYAH, RISE
AND FALL, supra note 80, at 572, 578; see also Pettit, supra note 78, at 300. For the de-
scription of the death of the contract in American law, see GILMORE, supra note 79.
85. For the general historical development until the appearance of the modern con-
tract in the U.S., see Kevin M. Teeven, A History of Legislative Reform of the Common
Law of Contract, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 35, 77–78 (1994). For the description of modern con-
tract law, see, e.g., GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN CONTRACT LAW, supra note 79, at 1, 7–12;
see also HORWITZ, supra note 80, at 34–35.
86. Eisenberg, No Law, supra note 76, at 817–18.
87. Id. at 813.
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various social interests,88 such as the responsibility of one contract-
ing party to the other. This modern shift, which enables substantial
scrutiny of contract stipulations and imposes obligations on the
parties to promote their mutual contractual interest with coopera-
tion, is well-articulated in the increasing use of the unconsciona-
bility doctrine89 and the willingness to adjust the terms of a contract
to changed circumstances.
Since the existing scholarly literature describes in length the
transformation of classical contract law into modern contract law,
I will only briefly focus on the most relevant aspects of the shift
embodied in the modern model to our discussion regarding surro-
gacy contracts. Modern doctrines can serve as proper infrastructure
for refuting the criticisms against the legitimacy of surrogacy con-
tracts surveyed above in Part II. The essence of my arguments is
that the flexibility and complexity of the modern model supplies us
with better tools to cope with procedural and substantial intrinsic
contractual problems. In stark contrast to classical contract law, the
modern model permits more flexibility and fairness in the ordering
of the family realm, and especially in this intimate relationship.90 In
the second half of this Article I base my contention that the tradi-
tional antagonism of the legislators, courts, and scholars against
any contractual ordering of surrogacy is derived from the justified
fear of applying classical contract law, as outlined above.
B. Coping with the Problem of Unequal Power of the
Contracting Parties
There is no doubt that classical contract law fails in its inability
to cope properly with the problem of the inequity of power between
the contracting parties, and instead merely focuses on implementing
88. See, e.g., ATIYAH, INTRODUCTION, supra note 76, at 27–34; E. Allan Farnsworth,
Developments in Contract Law During the 1980’s: The Top Ten, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
203, 218 (1990); THE LAW OF CONTRACT 5 (Laurence Koffman & Elizabeth Macdonald
eds., 5th ed. 2004); Patrick S. Atiyah, Freedom of Contract and the New Right, in ESSAYS
ON CONTRACT 355, 361 (2d ed. 1990).
89. On cooperation and mutual consideration, see GILMORE, supra note 79, at 94–96;
ATIYAH, INTRODUCTION, supra note 76, at 121, 300–01; DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY
AGREEMENT 113 (1986). I will elaborate on the unconscionability doctrine infra. In the
meantime, see, e.g., “Unconscionability” As Ground for Refusing Enforcement of Contract
for Sale of Goods or Agreement Collateral Thereto, 18 A.L.R.3d 1305, 1307 (1968). For
a survey of the comparative legal systems concerning the implication of this doctrine in
the U.S., see, e.g., Ralph J. Mooney, The New Conceptualism in Contract Law, 74 OR. L.
REV. 1131, 1188–89 (1995).
90. For the mainstream of researchers who contend that modern contract law can
successfully resolve the pitfalls of classical law contracts, see Feinman, supra note 76,
at 1288.
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formal contractual principles.91 In contrast, the modern model serves
to minimize this problem of the inequity of power. The modern model
does so through a variety of doctrines, the most relevant being: trust,
fairness, reasonableness, good faith, increased disclosure obligation,
consideration of the reliance interest of the other party and his indi-
vidual needs, and unconscionability.92 In addition, there are several
specific doctrines that have developed in the modern model that
may exempt parties from their contractual responsibilities such as:
exploitation, economic duress, public policy, and frustration of pur-
pose. These standards and doctrines often serve to assist in resolving
various intrinsic contractual problems.
In this subpart I focus on the doctrine most relevant to the
surrogacy contract: the doctrine of unconscionability. This doctrine
is based on public values and standards of appropriate behavior.
Here, I explore its application in the general commercial contract
context, the spousal context, and the relevant surrogacy context,
which is the recognition of the legality of the surrogacy contract.
The doctrine of unconscionability is well-rooted in the ancient his-
tory of contract law. It first appeared in equity but was later embedded
in common law. Some assume that its ancestor is the Roman doc-
trine of Laesio Enormis and the Middle Ages’ theory of the fairness
consideration doctrine, which was very common in the American
judiciary and is the basis upon which courts invalidated unconscio-
nable contracts.93
In the modern era this doctrine was anchored into law by the
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) in 1954 and later in the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts.94 Some scholars thought this doctrine to
be one of the most innovative sections of the U.C.C., the biggest change
91. See Blake D. Morant, The Salience of Power in the Regulation of Bargains: Proce-
dural Unconscionability and the Importance of Context, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 925, 931
(2006); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 106 (1982); Michel
Rosenfeld, Contract and Justice: The Relation Between Classical Contract Law and Social
Contract Theory, 70 IOWA L. REV. 769, 776–84 (1985).
92. See Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 139,
186, 195 (2005).
93. See Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (Ch. 1750). Another and
earlier decision is Emanuel College v. Evans, 21 Eng. Rep. 494, 495 (1625). See also Dalzell
v. Dueber Watch-Case Mfg. Co., 149 U.S. 315, 325 (1893); Deweese v. Reinhard, 165 U.S.
386, 389 (1897); Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 410 (1889). For a survey of cases
before the enactment of the U.C.C., see RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 5:15
(4th ed. 2003); see also Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Role of Fault in Contract Law: Uncon-
scionability, Unexpected Circumstances, Interpretation, Mistake, and Nonperformance,
107 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 1415 n. 4–5 (2009) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Role of Fault].
94. See U.C.C. § 2-302; see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208. For the wide-
spread acceptance of this doctrine in every jurisdiction in the U.S., whether by the leg-
islature or the judiciary, see Eisenberg, Role of Fault, supra note 93, at 1415 n. 6–9.
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in contract law, and even its most valuable clause.95 In its modern
form this doctrine enables courts to directly inspect unconscionable
bargains, without any need to use one of the rigid classical doctrines,
and if necessary, intervene into the conditions of the contract.96
Using this doctrine, courts weigh the fairness of the bargain
when the contract was signed from both procedural and substantive
aspects. According to the vast majority of courts, it is necessary that
both aspects be unconscionable in some degree to justify any judicial
intervention.97 When a court concludes that a contract is unconscio-
nable, it may prevent its enforcement, invalidate the problematic
clauses, or otherwise restrain the unconscionable implication of the
problematic stipulations.98 There is no doubt that this doctrine has
challenged classical contract law notions99 and therefore one can find
both numerous opponents and supporters of the doctrine.100
Many scholars try to justify the unconscionability doctrine in
light of philosophical101 and contractual theories,102 while others tried
95. See, ALLAN E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.28, 307 (3d ed. 1999); DAVID SLAWSON,
BINDING PROMISES: THE LATE 20TH-CENTURY REFORMATION OF CONTRACT LAW 57 (1996);
Karl Llewellyn, Study of the Uniform Commercial Code in REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION
COMMISSION FOR 1954, at 121 (1954).
96. See Frank P. Darr, Unconscionability and Price Fairness, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1819,
1829 n. 64 (1994).
97. See Richard L. Barnes, Rediscovering Subjectivity in Contracts: Adhesion and
Unconscionability, 66 LA. L. REV. 123, 155–61 (2005).
98. Id. at 50.
99. For this statement and for a survey of many studies that outline the challenges
of this doctrine, see Lifshitz, supra note 28, at 330 n. 45.
100. The literature is enormous, therefore I will mention only the following seminal
articles: Harry G. Prince, Unconscionability in California: A Need for Restraint and
Consistency, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 459, 461 (1995); Steven W. Bender, Rate Regulation at the
Crossroads of Usury and Unconscionability: The Case for Regulating Abusive Commercial
and Consumer Interest Rates under the Unconscionability, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 721, 742–45
(1994); Evelyn L. Brown, The Uncertainty of U.C.C. Section 2-302: Why Unconscionability
has Become a Relic, 105 COM. L.J. 287, 306 (2000); Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and
the Crowd—Consumers and the Common Law Tradition, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 349, 354–57
(1969); Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON.
293, 293 (1975).
101. For basing the doctrine on the theories of Aristotle, Hegel and Kant, see, respec-
tively, James Gordley, Equality in Exchange, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1587, 1604–11, 1633–37
(1981); Peter Benson, Abstract Right and the Possibility of a Nondistributive Conception
of Contract: Hegel and Contemporary Contract Theory, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1077, 1080
(1989); Robert Wisner, Understanding Unconscionability: An Essay on Kant’s Legal Theory,
51 TORONTO U. FAC. L. REV. 396, 398 (1993). For more on the philosophical aspects of the
doctrine, see Philip Bridwell, The Philosophical Dimensions of the Doctrine of Uncon-
scionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1513, 1514 (2003).
102. See Horacio Spector, A Contractarian Approach to Unconscionability, 81 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 95, 99 (2006) (a contractarian approach); see also Larry A. DiMatteo &
Bruce L. Rich, A Consent Theory of Unconscionability: An Empirical Study of Law in
Action, 33 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 1067, 1070 (2006) (a consent theory).
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to reshape it into a more concrete and practical model.103 Nevertheless,
prima facie, the vast majority of the modern literature, at least in the
U.S., supports its existence. Amongst the claims there are the fol-
lowing justifications: in the commercial world, where the adhesion
contracts are very common this doctrine is very important,104 its wide
spectrum provides a very useful tool in court’s hands where other
objective doctrines have failed,105 during the years the courts have
agreed on a unified and clear framework of when and how to use
it.106 Even adherents of the economic analysis of law are inclined to
impose some restrictions on the freedom of contract precisely from the
motivation to strengthen the welfare policy inside the free market.107
Despite the criticisms against the doctrine, over the years courts
have widened and deepened the usage of this doctrine with flexible
implications, and today it is applied in the commercial context and
in a wide range of other contexts.108 As of the year 1995, every state
in the U.S. has anchored the doctrine in its jurisdiction.109 Moreover,
the majority of research studies agree on its necessity110 and today
it is an inherent part of the common law.111 In the last decade there
have been vast legal writings regarding its implementation, as in
103. See, e.g., Bender, supra note 100; Bridwell, supra note 101; and in the other articles
enumerated at Darr, supra note 96, at 1831 n. 76.
104. See Carol B. Swanson, Unconscionable Quandary: UCC Article 2 and the Uncon-
scionability Doctrine, 31 N.M.L. REV. 359, 359 (2001). For a comparison of adhesion con-
tract and unconscionability and for the need to see them as completing each other, see
Shmuel I. Becher, A “Fair Contracts” Approval Mechanism: Reconciling Consumer Con-
tracts and Conventional Contract Law, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 747, 748 nn. 1, 3 (2009).
105. See Swanson, supra note 104, at 386–87; see also Morant, supra note 91, at 940.
For a survey of cases that were given especially due to the flexibility and the comfort of
this doctrine, see Barnes, supra note 97, at 159–60 n. 175.
106. This is the conclusion of the following researchers: Darr, supra note 96, at 1848
(arguing that consistent and predictable patterns emerge from judicial interpretation of
unconscionability); Daniel T. Ostas, Predicting Unconscionability Decisions: An Economic
Model and an Empirical Test, 29 AM. BUS. L.J. 535, 541–42 (1992).
107. See Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Uncon-
scionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract,
24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283, 284 (1995). For the justification of this doctrine from an economic
analysis of law perspective, see F.H. Buckley, Three Theories of Substantive Fairness, 19
HOFSTRA L. REV. 33, 37–64 (1990); see also Russell Korobkin, A “Traditional” and
“Behavioral” Law-and-Economics Analysis of Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture
Company, 26 U. HAW. L. REV. 441, 462–68 (2004) (discussing economic analysis of un-
conscionability claims).
108. See Swanson, supra note 104; Darr, supra note 96, at 1832; DiMatteo & Rich,
supra note 102, at 1084.
109. See SLAWSON, supra note 95, at 5.
110. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The
Return of Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 757, 793, 793 n. 132 (2004).
111. For an overview of many articles that document the widespread acceptance of this
doctrine, see Prince, supra note 100, at 462 n. 12; Swanson, supra note 104, at 362 n. 29.
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the context of arbitration.112 There are claims that with the growing
use of arbitration the usage of the unconscionability doctrine will
be increased.113
The potential implication of this doctrine in the private ordering
of spousal relationships has been explored by some scholars114 and
it was found that from the very first days of the Anglo-American
system, the notion of freedom of contract, especially in equity, was
restricted due to the notions of best interests of the child and intrin-
sic unconscionable characteristics such as fairness ideals.115 In the
wider context of determining legal parenthood by agreement, this
doctrine of unconscionability has not been sufficiently explored in
theory or in practice.116 One can thus find only sporadic and basic
discussions of its implication such as in the case of two lesbians,
where one had donated the ova when signing the agreement, and
the other donated the gestation.117
In this unique case, the court maintained that enforcing the
agreement as it is with its embodied conclusion that the donor would
not be considered an additional legal mother is unconscionable.118
Similarly, some studies claim that even dispositive agreements con-
cerning the fate of fertilized ova are procedurally and substantively
unconscionable because of the inherently unequal gender powers be-
tween men and women.119 In addition, there exists only a preliminary
112. Stempel, supra note 110, at 860 (“The rediscovery of unconscionability has softened
the rougher edges of the Supreme Court’s arbitration formalism and made both the judi-
cial and arbitration systems more effective.”); Susan A. Fitzgibbon, Teaching Important
Contracts Concepts: Teaching Unconscionability Through Agreements to Arbitrate
Employment Claims, 44 ST. LOUIS L.J. 1401, 1401–07 (2000).
113. See Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of
Unconscionability, 52 BUFFALO L. REV. 185, 194–98 (2004).
114. See, e.g., Barbara A. Atwood, Ten Years Later: Lingering Concerns About the
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, 19 J. LEGIS. 127, 128–29 (1993); Carol Frommer Brod,
Premarital Agreements and Gender Justice, 6 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 229, 233 (1994);
Paul B. Marrow, Squeezing Subjectivity from the Doctrine Of Unconscionability, 53 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 187, 206–10 (2005–2006); Howard Fink & June Carbone, Between Private
Ordering and Public Fiat: A New Paradigm for Family Law Decision-Making, 5 J. L.
FAM. STUD. 1, 7 (2003).
115. See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 112–33 (3d ed.
1990); Emily L. Sherwin, Law and Equity in Contact Enforcement, 50 MD. L. REV. 253,
253–54 (1991).
116. For a contention that the American courts have not yet discussed the implication
of the unconscionability doctrine in the context of fertility treatments a decade and half ago,
see L. Kuo, Lessons Learned from Great Britain’s Human Fertilization and Embryology
Act: Should the United States Regulate the Fate of Unused Frozen Embryos?, 19 LOY.
L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1027, 1033–34 (1997).
117. K.M. v. E.G., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 136, 146–47 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 2004).
118. See id.
119. See Ellen A. Waldman, Disputing over Embryos: Of Contracts and Consents, 32
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 897, 925–30 (2000).
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discussion regarding whether the enforcement of IVF agreements,
especially when a dispute is centered around the fate of fertilized ova,
is fair. In any case, this existing discussion is premised on the prelim-
inary question of the fairness of the agreement and does not yet deal
with the implementation of the unconscionability doctrine per se.120
Because there are no clear criteria regarding how the doctrine
of unconscionability should be implemented in the context of surro-
gacy contracts, plenty of room remains for use of this doctrine in
order to both proactively and even retroactively prevent the signing
of any unconscionable contracts. This may in turn lead to a better
means to invalidate problematic conditions, and in the worst case
scenarios, invalidate entire problematic agreements. The implemen-
tation of this doctrine is even more important in light of the increas-
ing criticism that the entire surrogacy practice is unconscionable
due to its obvious inclination towards the intending parents and
fertility clinic at the expense of the surrogate mother.121 According
to this contention, the stipulations of any given surrogacy contract
(when viewed in light of strong notions of freedom of contract) are
inherently unconscionable.122
Certainly, if a court were to find that unconscionability exists
due to one of the following defenses: fraud, lack of capacity, undue
influence, or duress, then the contract becomes voidable.123 There-
fore, courts should proactively inspect surrogacy contracts for any
unconscionable procedural or substantive terms.
Procedural unconscionability can be found in the following cases:
gross inequality of bargaining power, inability to read or understand
the provisions of the contract, significant gap in age intelligence or
education, fraud, unfair surprise, and the like.124 One example is an
instance where the surrogate mother has to sign the contract with
her fingerprint because she does not have basic reading and writing
abilities necessary to understand the contract’s terms and sign her
name. In the most problematic incidents such circumstances may
justify the invalidation of the entire contract, even if the stipula-
tions of the contract have been explained to her orally. Another
120. See Robertson, supra note 53, at 418–20. Robertson nonetheless concluded that
this fear should not overcome the importance of enforcing the contract. See also Mark
C. Haut, Divorce and the Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 493,
519–22 (1999) (describing the role of contract defenses in embryo disputes).
121. See Coleman, supra note 30, at 513.
122. See Susan Ince, Inside the Surrogacy Industry, in FAMILY MATTERS: READINGS ON
FAMILY LIVES AND THE LAW 104–12 (Martha Minow ed., 1993). For acceptance and
rejection of the conclusion of her claims, see Coleman, supra note 30, at 511–14; Denise
E. Lascarides, A Plea for the Enforceability of Gestational Surrogacy Contracts, 25
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1221, 1255–58 (1997).
123. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 164, 175, 177, 208.
124. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 cmt. a, b, d (1981).
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example is the instance where a contract has a “hold harmless” clause,
which means that despite the nature of the circumstances the sur-
rogate mother has agreed to not sue the fertility clinic for any sort
of negligence.125
Substantive unconscionability can be found in any circumstances
where the surrogate mother receives monetary consideration sub-
stantially below what is considered the prevailing reasonable value
of her surrogacy service.126 In addition, this sort of substantive un-
conscionability can emerge anywhere where there are obviously op-
pressive terms that are unreasonably favorable to one party at the
expense of the other. For example, a provision that requires the sur-
rogate mother to use only the medical and psychological services
chosen for her and provided by the fertility clinic, e.g., a contract
that includes language such as: “[Surrogate mother must] follow the
advice of the attending physician, even if it meant undergoing . . .
a caesarean delivery [or other medical procedure].”127 Similarly, the
following problematic clause is substantively unconscionable: “Surro-
gate mother and her husband must sign all documents provided by
the (company) including but not limited to the surrogate mother agree-
ment and contract.”128
C. Coping with the Problem of Change of Heart
In contrast to classical contract law, where human beings are
treated as rational agents, in the modern model the conception is
more realistic and human beings are treated as individuals with
cognitive limitations and therefore, at times need judicial interven-
tion to protect themselves from their own self and from others.129
The problem of change of heart in the realm of enforcing surrogacy
contracts is relevant in cases where the surrogate mother insists on
keeping the child in her custody and, in rare incidents, where the
intending parents are not interested in taking the child into their
custody. It should thus generally be known that changing one’s mind
is not necessarily possible in every case and “[t]he risk of subsequent
regret is the price we pay for our commitment to personal autonomy
and responsibility in the face of uncertainty.”130
125. See Coleman, supra note 30, at 513.
126. Id. at 514.
127. Id. at 513.
128. Id.
129. See Leon E. Trakman, Winner Take Some: Loss Sharing and Commercial Imprac-
ticability, 69 MINN. L. REV. 471, 479 (1985); Eyal Zamir, The Efficiency of Paternalism,
84 VA. L. REV. 229, 236 (1998).
130. Peter H. Schuck, Some Reflections on the Baby M Case, 76 GEO. L.J. 1793, 1799
(1988).
2014] IN DEFENSE OF SURROGACY AGREEMENTS 451
The huge emotional, physical, and economic efforts and invest-
ments that are involved in the surrogacy agreement justify the un-
derstanding that the contract will be eventually enforced. In addition,
in any case where the intention and will of the contracting parties
were deliberate and explicit, their agreement should be enforced for
the sake of keeping the stability and certainty of the entire process
of the surrogacy practice; the knowledge that this agreement is irre-
versible may minimize any thought of withdrawing from the initial
agreement. The cognitive inability to foresee some future develop-
ments should not totally abolish the important option of proactive
private ordering at the time when the sides are close to each other,
as when negotiating the agreement, and later on when enforcing
their agreement.
My contention that the surrogate mother cannot be totally
exempted from her contractual obligations is supported by the ar-
guments of many other scholars who maintain that because the
surrogate mother has the most important information about her
own ability to serve as surrogate, she should control her emotions
or otherwise not enter into a surrogacy agreement.131 In addition,
others hold that even if the surrogate mother has a change of
heart and we as a society do not enforce the contract, the surrogate
mother should then be asked to compensate the intending parents
by returning the consideration or even paying additional compensa-
tory damages.132
This understanding is consistent with several leading U.S. de-
cisions where the courts concluded that a mere change of heart should
not exempt the surrogate mother from fulfilling her contractual obli-
gations.133 This is true in view of the fact that all sides, and foremost
the surrogate mother, have access to make an informed decision
prior to signing the contract. We want to avoid condoning the per-
petuation of future change of heart claims.134 Here it should be noted
that I return to this issue at the outset of the next Part where I sug-
gest the implementation of administrative mechanisms in order to
ensure that the parties genuinely give their informed consent. As a
131. See Shultz, supra note 53, at 349–51.
132. For the first and second options, see, respectively, Cook et al., supra note 56;
MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 56 (1993).
133. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993); Tanya Feliciano, Davis v.
Davis: What About Future Disputes?, 26 CONN. L. REV. 305, 349 n. 354 (1993). For courts’
attitude towards the initial intentional parenthood of the intending parents as the pre-
vailing factor, see Janet L. Dolgin, Solomon’s Dilemma: Exploring Parental Rights: The
“Intent” of Reproduction: Reproductive Technologies and the Parent-Child Bond, 26
CONN. L. REV. 1261, 1294 (1994).
134. For a similar argument, see Louis M. Seidman, Baby M and the Problem of Unstable
Preferences, 76 GEO. L. J. 1829, 1829 (1988).
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final note on the matter, a review of U.S. courts’ holdings revels that
in most cases a typical surrogate mother’s change of heart is often
rejected by the courts as a valid basis for invalidating, or not up-
holding in totality, a contract except in the rare cases where some
visitation rights were granted to the surrogate mother.135
With respect to these general arguments that a priori surrogacy
agreements should be enforced, I want to lay out an additional doc-
trine that modern contract law offers us—the theory of relational
contract. This theory may assist us in specific incidents where a
surrogacy contract needs to be adjusted due to change of heart or
changed circumstances. This theory emerged during the last century
in the nineteen-seventies and as a reaction to classical contract law’s
limits; some even argue that this theory is the “mirror image” of the
old contract model and is the answer to the real world situations that
arise.136 The relational contract theory was fueled by the criticism
of Ian R. Macneil following empirical studies on the gap that exists
between the initial contractual rights and obligations and those that
are eventually applied during the contract’s performance.137
Many sociologists and psychologists also contend that there are
extrinsic contractual factors that influence the contract’s perfor-
mance, the central of which, for the sake of our discussion, is the
importance of keeping promises, consideration the other’s needs,
and the parties’ readiness to cooperate.138 This is true not as much
when dealing with short-term discrete transactional contracts rather
with long-term contracts between two stable contracting parties,
which embody a long-term extra-contractual relationship that de-
velops mutual interests, expectations, and interdependency. The
unique long-term relationship, which may be driven by public values,
such as justice, solidarity, interdependency and fairness, requires
close cooperation and even altruistic motivations.
135. See Matter of Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). For another legal dispute fol-
lowing a surrogate mother’s change of heart, see J.F. v. D.B., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th 1, 12–16
(Ct. Com. Pl. 2004) and the other verdicts enumerated in Marla J. Hollandsworth, Gay
Men Creating Families Through Surro-Gay Arrangements: A Paradigm for Reproductive
Freedom, 3 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 183, 186 n. 5 (1995).
136. See Eisenberg, No Law, supra note 76, at 812.
137. Robert W. Gordon, Macaulay, Macneil, and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power
in Contract Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 565, 570 (1985).
138. For the phrase ‘mirror image,’ see Eisenberg, No Law, supra note 76, at 812. For
a further discussion, see Ewan McKendrick, The Regulation of Long-Term Contracts in
English Law, in GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN CONTRACT LAW 305, 312 (Jack Beatson &
Daniel Friedmann eds., 1995); see also Stuart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in
Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOCIOL. REV. 55, 57 (1963). For empirical studies,
see, e.g.,Gordon, supra note 137, at 560. For an evaluation of the importance of Prof.
Macneil’s writing in promoting the development of the relational contract theory, see Mary
Keyes & Kylie Burns, Contract and the Family: Whither Intention, 26 MELB. U. L. REV.
577, 585 n. 51 (2002). For an updated survey of sociological and psychological researches,
see the writings of Stewart Macaulay.
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According to the common relational contract theory, the interde-
pendency of the parties causes them to give less weight to the initial
planning and documentation of the contract and its stipulations,
while giving more weight to the flexible, reciprocal, and soldiery be-
havior of the two sides. That means that the agreement is dynamic
and should not be inspected solely at the moment of execution, but
during its performance as well. When changed circumstances occur,
the sides should consider each other’s needs, and should not insist
on following the initial agreement. Instead, they should adjust the
agreement to new circumstances while recognizing the dynamic and
flexible characters of the modern contract.
Furthermore, it is very difficult to speak today about one singular
relational contract theory since one can find in the research literature
a variety of theories developed by scholars.139 Similarly, the prevailing
contention is that in every given contract one can find some aspects
of the relational contract and while we are getting closer to the re-
lational contract’s special characters, we should treat it in a more
communal and public manner.140 Scholars disagree as to whether
the relational contract deserves special regulation in addition to the
classical and modern law models141 or whether it fits into the latter
model.142 Scholars also disagree on how de facto this sort of contract
should be operatively implemented.143 In spite of the vast amount of
scholarly literature, the relational contract theory still has yet to
reach its full maturity and so far, is used mostly in the long-term con-
tract realm. Some scholars anticipate nonetheless that this theory
will gain more influence and its ethical influence will increase.144
Today it is already true that many practical implementations of this
theory can be found in various legal relationships in general, and
specifically in the fields of insurance, employment, and arbitration.145
139. For a further discussion on the various relational contract theories in Prof. Mac-
neil’s writing, see Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries,
94 NW. U.L. REV. 877, 881 (2000) [hereinafter Macneil, Relational Contract Theory].
140. See Ian Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691, 738–40
(1974) [hereinafter Macneil, The Many Futures]; Macneil, Contracts, supra note 73; IAN
R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRACTUAL
RELATIONS 28 (1980); IAN R. MACNEIL, THE RELATIONAL THEORY OF CONTRACT: SELECTED
WORKS OF IAN MACNEIL (David Campbell ed., 2001).
141. See the opinion of Eisenberg, Limits of Cognition, supra note 37, at 251 and Ian
R. Macneil in his various articles.
142. See the opinion of McKendrick, supra note 138, at 332; Eisenberg, No Law, supra
note 76, at 806; Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 NW.
U.L. REV. 847, 848 (2000).
143. See Jay M. Feinman, The Insurance Relationship as Relational Contract and the
“Fairly Debatable” Rule for First-Party Bad Faith, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 553, 554 (2009).
144. See Gordon, supra note 137, at 566.
145. For a similar modern implication, see id. at 556–59.
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In the recent legal literature one can also find an increasing
conceptualization of the spousal relationship as a relational con-
tract. It is worth noting that in his early articles Professor Macneil
conceptualized the marriage contract as a relational contract.146
Professor Macneil’s conceptualization is accurate due to the follow-
ing arguments: the spousal relationship is long-term and dynamic
while the economic aspects are not central to the contract, the
spousal relationship is characterized by economic interdependency,
cooperation, and altruistic motivations, and the spousal relationship
includes explicit and implicit public values and social interests.147
Indeed some scholars have applied this theory in various spousal
relationships—i.e., private ordering of the monetary aspects of mar-
ried couples or cohabitants and even of gay couples.148
Still, it is only recently that scholars have begun to explore the
potential embedded in the application of the relational contract
theory to the family realm, and it is in the opinion of this research
that the relational contract theory should be applied to surrogacy
contracts as well. The special relationship embodied in the surro-
gate relationship, which includes contracting parties who are not
necessarily married spouses, is very subjective, complex, close, and
intimate. Many surrogates and intending mothers have very close
and warm relationships during the pregnancy, and at times this
relationship is considered even stronger than the spousal relation-
ship of the intending parents.149 Similarly, this unique and compli-
cated relationship may be long-term, since very often it is not clear
146. See Macneil, Contracts, supra note 73, at 857–58. But see Macneil, Relational
Contract Theory, supra note 139, at 13. For the conceptualization of the relational con-
tract theories in terms of marriage in the writings of Macneil and Macaulay, see Gordon,
supra note 137, at 569.
147. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA.
L. REV. 1225, 1230–32 (1998); Robert Leckey, Relational Contract and Other Models of
Marriage, 40 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 1, 2 (2002); John Wightman, Intimate Relationships,
Relational Contract Theory, and the Reach of Contract, 8 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 93,
94 (2000).
148. For the implementation of this theory in the context of same-sex marriage, see
Christensen, supra note 21, at 1334–38, 1348. See Kellye Y. Testy, An Unlikely Resur-
rection, 90 NW. U.L. REV. 219, 228–29 (1995). For a survey of the common denominator
between the relational contract and feminist theories, see Peter Linzer & Patricia A.
Tidwell, The Flesh-Colored Band Aid—Contracts, Feminism, Dialogue, and Norms, 28
HOUS. L. REV. 791, 794–800 (1991); see also Debora L. Threedy, Feminists & Contract
Doctrine, 32 IND. L. REV. 1247, 1257–59 nn. 550–59 (1999). For the contention that fem-
inism and contractual theories have a lot in common, see Martha M. Ertman, Book Review:
Legal Tenderness: Feminist Perspectives on Contract Law, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 545,
570–71 (2006).
149. For the intimacy and the unique relationship that were common in many surro-
gacy contracts, see generally ELLY TEMAN, BIRTHING A MOTHER: THE SURROGATE BODY
AND THE PREGNANT SELF (2010).
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when it will expire, whether it will achieve its goal, and when exactly
it will do so. There is even the possibility that if this agreement is
successful, the sides will agree on a second one.
A strong argument can be made that the surrogacy contract con-
forms to the typical characteristics of the relational contract theory
and therefore should be treated as a relational contract. In addition,
the contracting parties may not be well trained or aware of all the
various nuances of the contract and the difficulties inherent in the
fertility treatment process, the pregnancy process, and the delivery.
Moreover, often the surrogate mother may be not represented by a
lawyer and is blindly relying on the adhesion contract dictated by the
fertility clinic. A flexible and just contractual theory that accounts
for the special and subjective characteristics of the contracting parties,
the possibility of change of heart, the possibility of changed circum-
stances, and all the other extra contractual or legal factors may be
appropriate for the contractual ordering of the surrogacy.150
This innovation may be strengthened in almost all the following
parameters: the surrogacy contract may encounter strong difficul-
ties such as the intending parents’ splitting up or divorce, loss of
legal capacity, passing away of one of the parties, or the intending
parents’ unexpected success in achieving a child from natural inter-
course. Mutual expectations, obligations and reliance on the con-
tract may vary in the long run since it impossible to foresee all the
possible changed circumstances, which may easily cause a change
of heart. The essence of a surrogacy contract is to privately order a
very personal and complicated relationship that is not a usual eco-
nomic bargain by its nature, and embodies substantial personal,
social, and psychological needs. It is very difficult to evaluate and
estimate its full and appropriate consideration. The contractual ob-
ligations are not always transferable to someone else and they are
supported by a social support system with very important values,
such as the right of procreation. The importance of cooperation is
therefore substantial and there is even a readiness for altruism.
Because the relational contract theory holds that at the initial
contract execution stage there is no real ability to foresee and for-
mulate the accurate obligations and rights that the contractual rela-
tionship will render, the de facto performance of the contract should
be mandatory only in specific cases where it is ultimately deemed
necessary.151 The relational contract theory may support and even
150. See Flavia Berys, Interpreting a Rent-a-Womb Contract: How California Courts
Should Proceed When Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements Go Sour, 42 CAL. W. L. REV.
321, 346–47 (2006).
151. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA.
L. REV. 1089, 1091–92 (1981).
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strengthen the notion that the parties may resign from one, or more,
of the contractual obligations embodied in the surrogacy contract.
This is true not only after the contract’s execution and prior to the
beginning or success of the fertility treatments, where the balanced
interests still enable one of the sides not to fulfill his contractual
obligations, but I also contend that this option is crucial, especially
for the surrogate mother, and applicable even after the pregnancy
begins or the child is born.
The relational contract theory may create parental obligations,
rights, and even the grant of parenthood status itself due to an
implied agreement following de facto guardianship. My contention
generally means that the implication of the relational contract theory
may require, if necessary, flexible adjustment of the contractual obli-
gations ex-post in addition to the initial obligations that were agreed
upon ex-ante. These potential adjustments and the need for flexibility
may then allow for change to the initial agreement where there is
a change of heart or changed circumstances and the de facto perfor-
mance of the contract by both sides, explicitly or implicitly, indicates
that the parties agree to change the initial agreement.
Putting aside the above discussion regarding who should be
recognized as the legal parent of the resulting child (i.e., who has
the right to the contract in a zero sum game), I also seek to introduce
a novel idea that the relational contract theory permits us to explore:
splitting the scope of parental rights in accordance with the scope of
the parties’ fulfillment of parental obligations. In other words, in a
case where a gestational surrogate mother, despite not being biolog-
ically related to the child, fulfills, de facto, the various parental obli-
gations towards that child. In that case, she may then be given
parental status or at least several parental rights such as visitation.
To elaborate, I contend here that in accordance with the tool of
relational contract theory, legal parentage (in whole or in part) should
be given to every individual who intends, wishes and agrees to be-
come a legal parent of the child. If the individual intends to acquire
full legal parentage, he or she will be given full status and rights.
However, if it is that party’s intent to acquire only partial legal
parentage, he or she could be granted a partial legal parental status
in accordance with the initial surrogacy agreement. In the latter
scenario, that party will then acquire the exact range of parental
rights in accordance with the acceptance of his parental obligations.
This accurate determination of the party’s parental status includes
the derived obligations and rights that should be determined by a
mutual private agreement that is subordinated for public review.152
152. See Margalit, supra note 57, at 26.
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In doing so, we can then create an a-gender incentive that would
not depend on sexual inclination or on marital status. Instead and
in the truest form of what is the best interest of the child, only an
individual who fulfills the needs of the child will enjoy full parental
rights. A parent, the surrogate mother in our context, who chooses
to partially accept his parental obligations, will receive partial pa-
rental rights, and an individual, the intending parent in our context,
who prefers not to undertake any parental obligation accordingly
will not acquire any legal status or parental rights. After accepting
that legal parentage status is not monolithic and binary but is more
diverse, this novel differentiation enables the parties to contract for
acquiring full or partial legal parentage status. Therefore, we should
ex-ante distinguish between three potential legal parentage statuses:
full parentage, which includes the full range of legal obligations and
rights; partial parentage, which entails the acquisition of partial
parental obligations and rights in accordance with their fulfillment;
and non-parentage, which exempts the party from any parental ob-
ligations and rights.
The last option of non-parentage is similar to the common legal
practice and based upon the same fundamental best interest of child
determination. Here, a parent who does not want to or is unable to
fulfill his parental obligation loses his legal parentage along with
the custody of the child. In my opinion, this differentiation between
those three stages of legal parentage fits well with our well-established
best interests of the child standard. In doing so, we would provide
a clear incentive for parents to undertake their full parental obliga-
tions in order to receive full parental status and corresponding rights.
The shift from a parent’s interests and rights in favor of the welfare
and best interests of the child will probably strengthen and not
weaken the welfare and the best interest of child.
This innovation expands our legal options and gives the child
an important option for preserving the existing child-parent rela-
tionship with his gestational mother, who may give him additional
emotional support without forcing her to accept full legal parentage.
It is worth noting that the current legal system does not currently
recognize this intermediate status; therefore potential intended par-
ents are forced either to surrender their legal parentage or to accept
unwanted full parentage, which may be detrimental to both sides
under the given circumstances.
Moreover, with respect to the intending parent, it may be the
case that changed circumstances such as a divorce, loss of legal ca-
pacity or death, or de facto non-performance of parental obligations
or neglect may then cause the party to lose his legal parenthood.
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However, since we are dealing with changing the initial agreement,
especially when it was judicially preauthorized, we should enable
this withdrawal only by receiving judicial permission. It is obvious
that this special permission should be granted only in rare cases
where extreme changed circumstances are at hand and there is not
merely an unjustified change of heart, as is required in the Israeli
Surrogate Motherhood Agreements Law.153 In any case, when the
child was already taken from the surrogate mother and handed to the
intending parents, significant time has passed, and the child is now
attached to the parents, the parents no longer have the option of re-
turning the child back to the surrogate mother. The narrow exceptions
are very extreme cases that require the court’s special permission.154
D. Coping with the Problem of Changed Circumstances
The last substantial problem inherent in surrogacy contracts
that was not addressed by classical contract law but is addressed by
the modern model is the problem of changed circumstances. The clas-
sical model does not differentiate between short-term agreements
and long-term agreements, despite the fact that in the latter context
changed circumstances is a substantial problem. By its nature, the
long-term contract is more exposed to the possibility of unforeseen
incidents, which thereby expose the parties to additional dangers
which increase in proportion with the duration of the contract. These
problems derive from intrinsic factors that are inherent to the con-
tract, its enforcement, and other extrinsic factors.
The difficulties of contractual ordering increase when a long-
term contract is at issue because the justification for not enforcing
the agreement in its original form is strong. The essence of this con-
tention is that in the case of a long-term agreement, the sides are
often interested in leaving open or flexible the ordering of their con-
tractual risks, obligations, and rights for the next stages. Recogniz-
ing their inability to foresee all future scenarios, the parties believe
that if any circumstances change after the execution of the agree-
ment, they will cooperate later on and work together to find the
right solution.
The modern contract model is very sensitive to the uniqueness of
different types of contracts, especially with the unique characteristics
153. See, e.g., Abraham Benshushan & Joseph G. Schenker, Legitimizing Surrogacy
in Israel, 12 HUM. REPROD. 1832, 1833 (1997).
154. See Andrea E. Stumpf, Redefining Mother: A Legal Matrix for New Reproductive
Technologies, 96 YALE L.J. 187, 206 n. 74 (1986); see, e.g., MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE
MOTHERHOOD 151 (1998).
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of a long-term contract. Thus, one can find much scholarly literature
that deals with the economic and legal aspects of the long-term
contract.155 The cognitive inability to anticipate all future scenarios
worsens in the spousal context; thus, in this intimate realm, rigid-
ity of enforcement will often directly lead to unjust results.156 How-
ever, the modern model supplies us with several tools that help deal
with such problems. One significant tool—adjusting the contract to
changed circumstances—is set forth in the writings of Lenore J.
Weitzman and enables the implementation of the contractual para-
digm in the spousal contract’s realm.157
The American Law Institute (ALI) concludes that in the familial
context it is inherently more difficult to foresee changed circum-
stances, therefore there is an urgent need to adopt a policy that al-
lows for the adjustment of contracts to the changed circumstances.158
Thus, many research studies recommend that the contract should be
inspected in light of the new and not the original circumstances.159
Practically speaking, the implementation of the changed circum-
stances doctrine in the familial context may be found in child support
and prenuptial agreements. This doctrine is justified on the grounds
that spouses, in contrast to businessmen, typically do not have the
benefit of constant continuous legal counsel and therefore room must
be left for changing and updating spousal agreements in accordance
with changed circumstances.160
155. On the failure of the classical law contract to enable flexibility in any given long
term contractual relationship, see Macneil, The Many Futures, supra note 140, at 763–65;
see also Ian Macneil, Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Presentiation, 60 VA. L. REV.
589, 592–93 (1974). On the ability to withdraw from a contractual obligation due to
changed circumstances, see U.C.C. 2-615(a), c. 1; Restatement (Second) of Contracts
261–72. For an initial discussion of these doctrines, see Richard E. Speidel, Contract
Excuse Doctrine and Retrospective Legislation: The Winstar Case, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 795,
800–01 (2001); James Gordley, Impossibility and Changed and Unforeseen Circumstances,
52 AM. J. COMP. L. 513, 525–30 (2004); Nancy Kim, Mistakes, Changed Circumstances
and Intent, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 473, 504–09 (2008).
156. See, e.g., Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow, supra note 75, at 186–88; Shultz, supra
note 75, at 291–307 and in the research enumerated in Naomi R. Cahn, Parenthood,
Genes, and Gametes: The Family Law and Trusts and Estates Perspectives, 32 U. MEM.
L. REV. 563, 569 n. 24 (2002).
157. See WEITZMAN, supra note 75, at 249–50. On the new model’s flexibility and there-
fore suitability for the familial intimate realm, see Shultz, supra note 75, at 292–93.
158. See ALI, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 982–83, 987 (2000).
159. See Thomas J. Oldham, Premarital Contracts Are Now Enforceable Unless . . ., 21
HOUS. L. REV. 757, 775–76 (1984); see also Atwood, supra note 114, at 139, 140, 148–49.
160. For a discussion of the changed circumstances doctrine in the context of child
custody and maintenance, see Cheri L. Wood, Childless Mothers?—The New Catch-22:
You Can’t Have Your Kids and Work for Them Too, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 383, 393–96
(1995); see also Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach
to the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835, 893 n. 270 (2000).
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Thus, this understanding is already well embodied in the mod-
ern contract model doctrine which resolves the problem by allowing
for adjustment of the initial agreement following renegotiation. This
is at least true when dealing with long-term contracts that, based
upon an explicit or implicit agreement between the parties, will min-
imize the negotiation in the initial agreement and allow for renego-
tiation in the future if necessary.161 This ability to update a contract
was rejected by the classical contract model because it was contrary
to the well-accepted notion of freedom of contract and it created un-
certainty.162 However, today in several European countries, the mod-
ern contract model and this doctrine are so common that it is even
a mandatory obligation.163
Moreover, existing modern contract law research already sets
forth claims regarding the importance of this doctrine in the modern
era. For instance, Richard E. Speidel claimed that the inherent
obligation to renegotiate a contract is substantial thereby enabling
the courts’ power to adjust a contract to changed circumstances (which
is best achieved following the results of the sides’ renegotiation). His
argument is premised on the notion of efficiency and that adjusting
the contract to the later circumstances may better serve the contract’s
purpose. Moreover, it is well known that the contracting parties are
best situated to find the most efficient solution to the new circum-
stances,164 and the parallel ability of the court, which does not have
at its disposal the same information, is much narrower. Similarly,
the modern model has assimilated the notion that the contract is not
perfect at the time of execution and during its performance the parties
must therefore be required to act in consideration of each others’ in-
terests and even assist the counterparty in case of hardship.
Furthermore, Robert A. Hillman maintains that this notion of
cooperation and good faith renegotiation in order to accommodate
hardships is the foundation of the relational contract. He claims
that a refusal to renegotiate may therefore be treated as a breach of
161. See Gidon Gottlieb, Relationism: Legal Theory for a Relational Society, 50 U. CHI.
L. REV. 567, 568, 572–73 (1983).
162. See Speidel, supra note 36, at 404; Ian Ayres, Valuing Modern Contract Scholarship,
112 YALE L.J. 881, 892–93 (2003).
163. See Denis Tallon, Hardship, in TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE 499, 502-04
(Arthur S. Hartkamp et al eds., 3d ed. 2004) (articulating that even in the states where this
obligation doesn’t exist, courts may punish such a refusal to a good faith renegotiation).
164. See Robert A. Hillman, Court Adjustment of Long-Term Contracts: An Analysis
under Modern Contract Law, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1, 19 (1987); Trakman, supra note 129, at
490; John P. Dawson, Judicial Revision of Frustrated Contracts: The United States, 64
B.U.L. REV. 1, 17–18, 36 (1984).
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the contract165 and that any legal system that exalts fairness in en-
forcing contracts should endorse renegotiation as part of the general
obligation of the contracting parties to cooperate.166 Accordingly, in
recent years this doctrine has become increasingly popular in various
commercial contracts.167 As compared to in the past, some scholars
now contend that in light of the privatization of the family168 this
doctrine is applicable even in the spousal realm and the spousal
obligations and rights are therefore renegotiable.169
This shift in legal thinking is reasonable due to our abandon-
ment of the traditional permanent marriage status and adoption of
broader freedom of contract ideals that teach us that the marriage
agreement includes the ability for renegotiation.170 This concept is
supported by economic theories that hold that marriage is no longer
a durable and sustainable relationship and is therefore subject to
renegotiation by the parties.171 It is worth noting the contradictory
development directions of modern contract theory and modern family
law. While the majority of agreements in the first context are basi-
cally adhesion and non-negotiable contracts,172 in the latter context
we can trace the dramatic shift towards giving more freedom of con-
tract, including renegotiation.
Thus, in my opinion, the changed circumstances doctrine fits well
into the contractual ordering of surrogacy where extreme changed
circumstances may occur and should be properly considered. Because
surrogacy contracts deal with elementary human rights, which are
of high personal and social importance, any rigid enforcement of
such contracts or total withdrawal from them may cause damage
165. For an offering of this normative model for contract interpretation, see Michael
P. Van Alstine, Of Textualism, Party Autonomy, and Good Faith, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1223, 1287–92 (1999). For the last contention, see Hillman, supra note 164, at 4.
166. See Hillman, supra note 164, at 7, 12–14; see also PATRICK S. ATIYAH, PROMISES,
MORALS AND LAW (1981).
167. See Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of
Efficient Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 629, 633–36 (1988); Warren F. Schwartz & Alan O.
Sykes, The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade
Organization, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 179, 185–86 (2002); Stewart Macaulay, Renegotiations
and Settlements: Dr. Pangloss’s Notes on the Margins of David Campbell’s Papers, 29
CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 281 (2007).
168. See Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443,
1460–61 (1992).
169. See Christensen, supra note 21, at 1326 nn. 149–50.
170. See Steven L. Nock, Time and Gender in Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1971, 1984
(2000).
171. See Ann L. Estin, Economics and the Problem of Divorce, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 517, 522–23 (1995).
172. See Bix, Domestic Agreements, supra note 43, at 1766–67 and his other studies
at supra note 75.
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that is detrimental to the sides. Similarly, every other considered
solution, such as monetary refund or compensation, which may be
appropriate in the commercial context, is irrelevant in the intimate
context of surrogacy contracts since the sole goal of the agreement
is the birth of a child and the establishment of that child’s legal par-
enthood. Likewise, we should not forget that the subject of such
agreement is a child whose interests and rights could be badly dam-
aged should the parties be unable to reach a just compromise. Lastly,
since there is often a close and intimate relationship between the
parties, it is the parties—not the courts—that are best situated to
know what is the best compromise for them.
In addition, in rare cases there is a chance that eventually un-
foreseen changed circumstance will cause one of the sides to change
his mind and desire to withdraw from the contract. In such cases, I
suggest that we do not strictly seek to follow or enforce the terms of
the agreement as originally executed due to public policy, the diffi-
culties in trying to force parenthood on an unwilling person, and
potential damage to that individual. This was concluded several
times in leading U.S. cases in spite of the fact that the intending
parents will be left without the ability to fulfill their desire to be-
come parents.173
As the modern model teaches us, we should enable one of the
sides to then withdraw from the agreement. Thus, a mandatory
“cooling period” (I recommend here two weeks’ time) should be
enacted should one of the parties have a change of heart or circum-
stances, upon which the parties would be asked to renegotiate. If
then, for any reason, the renegotiation does not result in an agree-
able compromise, a party may withdraw from the agreement if that
party has a reasonable justification, i.e., has encountered extreme
changed circumstances. However, if it is merely a change of heart,
only upon judiciary intervention and permission would such with-
drawal be permitted on a case-by-case basis.
It should be emphasized that this unique option of withdrawal
is supported by the prevailing legal practice in almost every country
that endorses the legality of the surrogacy contract, such as Israel
and the U.K. Both Israel and the U.K. allow a surrogate mother to
withdraw from a surrogacy contract following her change of heart.
While in the U.K. it is possible only during the 6-week cooling period,
in Israel it is possible only when a significant change in circumstances
173. See Matter of Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1240 (N.J. 1988); see also Becky A. Ray,
Embryo Adoptions: Thawing Inactive Legislatures with a Proposed Uniform Law, 28 S.
ILL. U. L. J. 423, 426 (2004).
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occurred and this shift will not damage the child’s best interests.174
In the U.S., Florida and New Hampshire have enacted a post-birth,
cooling period during which a surrogate mother may change her
mind before the child is taken from her. In addition, to ensure clear
instruction, I recommend the adoption of Nevada and Florida’s
practices, which require that the parties insert each side’s rights
and the status of the child into their agreement in the case of any
future disagreement.175
However, even under this doctrine, if for some reason an extreme
changed circumstances takes place and the parties are unable to
reach an agreement through renegotiation, then we may fall back
upon the second solution of allowing the court to adjust the contract
to the new circumstances, as offered by the modern model of con-
tract law.
V. IMPLEMENTING THE REQUIRED PRACTICAL ADMINISTRATIVE
AND LEGAL MECHANISMS FOR ACCOMPLISHING RECOGNITION
OF THE LEGALITY OF SURROGACY CONTRACTS
As set forth above, the central argument embodied in this Article
is that modern contract doctrines and theories often serve to im-
prove the contractual ordering of the surrogacy contract. In every
natural pregnancy risks exist, and no one can guarantee that a
healthy child will be born. Similarly, with every contract, especially
surrogacy contracts, there are many ethical and legal challenges. As
I outlined in Part III, society and the legal system are slowly but
surely gravitating toward completely recognizing the legality of sur-
rogacy contracts. However, we are not quite there yet and in order
to achieve the full recognition of surrogacy contracts, we should im-
plement some additional mechanisms. To this end, I set forth below
suggested mechanism and how these additional mechanisms would
work in practice once enacted.
The purpose of such mechanisms is to proactively ensure that
both parties are minimally exposed to the problems of unequal bar-
gaining power and the cognitive inability to foresee potential changes
174. See, e.g. Human Fertilisation Act, 38 Eliz., 2, 1990, c. 37, § 30 (Eng.) (enabling the
surrogate mother to withdraw from the contract during the first six weeks after the child
is born). The option of the cooling period is commonly supported by many legal scholars.
See, e.g., Swift, supra note 60, at 928, 954 (enumerating the cooling period option as one
of the three pillars of legalizing surrogacy contracts); Vicki C. Jackson, Baby M. and the
Question of Parenthood, 76 GEO. L.J. 1811, 1820, n. 24 (1988).
175. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.045 1(B) (2008); FLA. STAT. § 742.17 (2008); Abby
Brandel, Gender, Law and Health Care: Legislating Surrogacy: A Partial Answer to
Feminist Criticism, 54 MD. L. REV. 488, 504–05 (1995).
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in circumstances related to pregnancy and the delivery and thereby
maximize the chances that the contract will fit within our concepts
of public policy and be enforced.
In order to ensure the fairness of the surrogacy contract and the
possibility that it will be enforceable, administrative mechanisms
should be employed as early as the contract negotiation period. In
order to strengthen the initial agreement while evading the various
pitfalls of intrinsic contractual problems, we should act to strictly
adhere to the following prerequisites and ensure that: (i) the con-
tracting parties are receiving independent, sufficient, and reason-
able legal counseling and a thorough and comprehensive medical
explanation about the chances and risks, including the fact that
there a greater likelihood that a perfectly healthy baby may not be
born;176 (ii) both sides are receiving social and psychological and any
other needed support; (iii) the parties contract for various possible
scenarios including, but not limited to, the birth of a “sick” child, the
divorce of the intending parents, or the death of one of the parties;
and (iv) the gap in economic strength and ability of each of the parties,
especially that of the selling party, is not interfering with that party’s
free will (i.e., ensure that the monetary incentive does not cause
that party to undertake unreasonable contractual obligations).
In addition, specific prerequisites should be required for those
who want to be deemed fit as a potential surrogate mother. First, a
woman should not be permitted to act as surrogate mother unless
she already has a child through natural birth and thereby is better
situated to understand the implications of her actions and the deep
meaning of pregnancy and delivery. Second, a potential surrogate
mother must undergo a psychological evaluation to determine that
she is fit for the challenge. Third, the potential surrogate mother
must submit a physician’s affidavit stating that the physician ex-
amined her and deemed her to be mentally and physically fit for
surrogacy and was informed of the physical and psychological medi-
cal implications of doing so. Finally, the potential surrogate mother
should be required to undergo independent legal counseling with a
surrogacy contract expert as well any additional needed counseling
at the expense of the intending parents.
Only by enacting these suggested precautions may we properly
address the criticisms set forth above, minimize the possibility of
the surrogate mother’s change of heart during the pregnancy, assure
176. For the first proposal, see Sara Fovargue, Re R (IVF: Paternity of the Child):
Assisting Conception for the Single Infertile, 18(3) CHILD & FAM. L.Q. 423, 437–39 (2006).
For the second offer, see WARREN FREEDMAN, LEGAL ISSUES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY AND
HUMAN REPRODUCTION: ARTIFICIAL CONCEPTION AND MODERN GENETICS 28 (1991).
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the eventual enforcement of the surrogacy contract, and avoid fu-
ture disputes.177 In addition, enacting these prerequisites will con-
firm that the informed consent is as full, accurate, and as deliberate
as possible since common sense and past experience teaches us that
increasing awareness of the different chances and risks of unfore-
seen scenarios will minimize intrinsic contractual problems.178 Thus,
the process of informing all potential parties should in practice be
very effective in reducing possible problems. Further, the following
additional administrative measure should be implemented: medical
information should be organized and divided into definitive catego-
ries and sufficient time should be given to allow the potential parties
to evaluate and assimilate the information they have received prior
to signing the contract. The best way to put such actions into prac-
tice is to train professional consultants to make such determinations
on a case-by-case basis.
In order to avoid the possibility of future litigation, informed
consent of the contracting parties’ spouses, especially of the surro-
gate mother, is imperative. The surrogate mother’s husband should
further be made aware that if something goes wrong, they might
then end up being the parent of the child according to the prevailing
laws. The expectation and hope is that the party’s spouse’s signa-
ture, premised upon a more complete informed consent, will serve
to confirm the fairness of the process and decrease the possibility of
encountering unforeseen scenarios and thereby the difficulties asso-
ciated with coping with unforeseen changed circumstances. This in
turn will likely minimize the parties’ fear of each others’ change of
heart as well.
Moreover, in order to save the contracting parties from the prob-
lems that I enumerated above in Part II, we should also confirm the
fairness and completeness of the contract at the time of execution.
This is especially true because the abovementioned preconditions
and mechanisms, which focus on the negotiation period, may be in-
sufficient. Therefore, at the time of execution we should carefully
inspect the contract and confirm that the preconditions have suffi-
ciently yielded a fair contract that does not involve exploitation,
economic or emotional duress, or unconscionability. Furthermore,
prior to signing the contract we should inspect the standard surro-
gacy contracts that the fertility clinics and the brokerages use on an
177. See Blumenthal, supra note 54, at 210–11.
178. See Brandel, supra note 175, at 517–20; see also John A. Robertson, Precommit-
ment Strategies for Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 50 EMORY L.J. 989, 997–98, 1007,
1046 (2001).
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ongoing basis in order to confirm that they do not damage either
party’s rights.179
Similarly, we should confirm that the agreement accounts for
various potential circumstances dictating explicitly what should
occur if such circumstances arise. This really is the only way to
proactively confirm that any future changed circumstances will not
lead to the invalidation of the contract following any change of heart
or changed circumstances. Thus, I suggest that state and federal
legislatures create and publish an accepted comprehensive form of
standard surrogacy contract that includes mandatory stipulations in
order to avoid (to the extent possible) any acute contractual problems
that would abolish the legality and enforcement of surrogacy contracts.
However, the reality is that until my call to the legislators is
answered, especially at the federal level, it is safe to assume that
there is no choice other than to inspect agreements at the level of ju-
dicial scrutiny. Therefore, as an interim measure, I recommend that
all states and countries adopt the prevailing legal practice of several
states of the U.S.–mandatory judicial preauthorization for each sur-
rogacy agreement on a case-by-case basis. In Texas and Illinois, this
preauthorization is a voluntary option,180 while in Virginia and New
Hampshire, this practice is mandatory.181 Moreover, this legislation
can be found in prominent legislation proposals and Uniform Acts,
such as the USCACA, the UPA and recently the Model Act Governing
Assisted Reproduction Technology (hereinafter: “Model Act”).182
A similar practice is also used in the U.K, where it is possible
to get a “parental order” from the court, which determines the mu-
tual legal parenthood of spouses who used surrogate mother for
bringing their child to the world.183 This process allows for the
179. For a similar argument, see Lascarides, supra note 122, at 1257–58.
180. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/25 (2005); see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.751-63
(West 2002 & Supp. 2005).
181. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-159, 20-160 (2010); see also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 168-
B:20 to B:24 (West 2013).
182. For a survey of the required judicial preauthorization by those proposals, see
USCACA §§ 5–9. For a survey of the implementation of UPA §§ 801(a), 803, see Richard
F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction and the Functional
Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 661 n. 446, 663 nn. 453–57, 677 n. 575
(2002). For the importance of this implementation, see Robert E. Rains, What the Erie
“Surrogate Triplets” Can Teach State Legislatures About the Need to Enact Article 8 of
the Uniform Parentage Act (2000), 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 33–35 (2008). Similarly, Model
Act § 6 enables the intending parents to apply to the court to receive some parental rights.
For the modern legislative proposal, see American Bar Association Model Act Governing
Assisted Reproductive Technology Alternative A (2008), available at http://apps.american
bar.org/family/committees/artmodelact.pdf (embodying Model Act § 7).
183. See HFEA § 30; see also Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 56 Eliz. 2,
2008 c. 37, § 54 (Eng.) (articulating the parental orders). Following this procedure, the
2014] IN DEFENSE OF SURROGACY AGREEMENTS 467
monitoring of surrogacy agreements for any unconscionable stipu-
lation and makes sure that the required information is appropri-
ately given to both parties while minimizing as much as possible the
exposure to the contractual pitfalls. Only after the court is satisfied
that the agreement is appropriate will it legalize and validate a par-
ticular agreement in advance of execution.184 This interim method
is the only way to allow for freedom of contract and flexibility, but
also preservation of fairness and avoidance of exploitation or duress.
This precautionary process will also prove to always be friendlier,
cheaper, and faster than resolving through legal process.
CONCLUSION
The practice of surrogacy is gaining more and more legitimacy
in many of the states of the U.S. as well as among additional other
countries throughout the word. While I cannot deny that this prac-
tice is imbued with challenges and a variety of complicated legal-
ethical dilemmas, there is a feeling that nonetheless the negative
exposure that the surrogacy practice received in its early days, espe-
cially following the unfortunate Baby M case, the tide is turning and
it is time to focus on and enact appropriate regulations. This is
especially true because giving full and unregulated freedom of con-
tract, as some economic law scholars contend, is especially danger-
ous for the economically inferior party. Imposing strict restrictions,
however, is also dangerous and may only lead to fueling the black
market both inside and outside the U.S. and may similarly lead to
damaging the economically inferior party.
This Article focuses on three intrinsic contractual problems,
among the many intrinsic and extrinsic problems that surrogacy
contracts raise to the surface. The essence of this Article’s innova-
tion is the contention that those difficulties, while indeed very prob-
lematic under the realm of the classical contract law, are no longer
problematic due to the developments of the modern contract law.
Modern contract law today supplies us with doctrines and theories
that are needed to better cope with those problems and minimize
them to the extent practicable. To defend the surrogacy contract from
those problems, this Article offers specific practical administrative-
legal mechanisms that must be put into effect.
intending parents will be treated as the legal parents of the child and he will be treated
as a legitimate child.
184. For a similar claim in the research literature, see Fink & Carbone, supra note 114,
at 57–64; see also John A. Robertson, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Family,
47 HASTINGS L.J. 911, 923–25 (1996).
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The legal limbo concerning the practice of surrogacy that exists
today in the vast majority of the states of the U.S. is extremely det-
rimental and causes huge damage to its parties and the child who
is the subject of the agreement. As the practice of surrogacy gains
more and more popularity, the lack of appropriate state or federal
regulation is emphasized and increasingly damages more and more
individuals, some of whom are turning to surrogacy as a last resort
to becoming parents. Therefore, I suggest that legislators should
fully legalize surrogacy agreements and properly define their terms.
The time has arrived for the legal realm to follow the social accep-
tance already in place to recognize the legitimacy of the surrogacy
contract and to even follow suit with enforcement under the appro-
priate circumstances. This Article thus outlines the appropriate
blueprint for ordering surrogacy agreements in a complicated and
complex modern era in the hopes of moving one step closer to the
full recognition of surrogacy contracts.
